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FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
VII. CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE
A. Concurrent Sentence Doctrine and RICO
The concurrent sentence doctrine permits an appellate court sum-
marily to affirm a conviction when a defendant appeals from concurrent
sentences on plural counts of an indictment and the reviewing court sus-
tains the conviction carrying the longer sentence.' Courts, however,
apply the doctrine with caution because the collateral consequences of
affirming a conviction on the basis of the doctrine may affect the appel-
lant adversely.2 In United States v. Webster (Webster I),1 the Fourth
Circuit declined to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine and exercised
its discretion to review a conviction under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)4 because of the possible stigma stem-
ming from a racketeering conviction.' In reviewing the conviction, the
Fourth Circuit construed the meaning of "through" in the RICO provi-
sion proscribing the operation of any enterprise "through" a pattern of
racketeering activity.'
The Government accused Walter R. Webster of heading a major
drug distribution network in Baltimore, Maryland.' Webster lived with
Norma Thompson who owned and operated the 1508 Club Tavern and Li-
' United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 931 (4th Cir. 1980) (Russell, J.,
concurring and dissenting). In Truong, the defendant had received a 15 year sentence for es-
pionage and a 5 year sentence for conversion of government property. Id. The sentences
were to run concurrently. Id. The Fourth Circuit upheld the espionage conviction, and
therefore, found no occasion to consider Truong's challenge to his conversion conviction. Id.
See United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952, 956 (2d Cir. 1980) (concurrent sentence doctrine
permits appellate court, within its discretion, to affirm summarily a conviction for which ap-
pellant's sentence runs concurrently with another valid conviction). See generally Note, The
Concurrent Sentence Doctrine After Benton v. Maryland, 7 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 282
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Concurrent Sentence Doctrine].
See note 28 infra.
639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part on rehearing, Nos. 79-5204 & 79-5240, slip
op. (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 1982).
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976) (RICO).
639 F.2d at 183.
'Id. at 183-86. The Webster I court construed the meaning of the word "through" in
RICO section 1962(c) that provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). Section 1962(a) makes unlawful the receipt or use of income from
racketeering activity to acquire an interest in or operate an enterprise engaged in inter-
state commerce. H. R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4010. Section 1962(b) prohibits the acquisition of any enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. Id.; see note 68 infra.
' 639 F.2d at 183.
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quor Store (Club).' The prosecution alleged that Webster participated in
the operation of the Club and further that he used the Club to facilitate
the drug distribution network.' The evidence at trial established that
Webster used Club facilities and personnel to accept and relay narcotics
related messages and that on at least one occasion, Webster asked a
Club employee to provide Club-owned liquor to one of Webster's nar-
cotics customers who was waiting for a drug delivery."°
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland con-
victed Webster of violating the RICO statute" and the "Kingpin"
statute, 2 so-called because Congress intended it to apply to ring-leaders
of large-scale narcotics operations.1 3 The trial judge sentenced Webster
to fifty years for the Kingpin statute violation and twenty years for the
RICO conviction. 4 The RICO sentence was to run concurrently with the
Kingpin sentence." Webster appealed his RICO conviction to the Fourth
Circuit."6 Webster argued that the Government's evidence failed to show
that he conducted the Club's affairs "through" a pattern of racketeering
activity. 7 Webster specifically argued that the prosecution -failed to pro-




11 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976); see text accompanying note 4 supra. The District
Court convicted Webster for violating RICO section 1962(c). See note 6 supra.
.2 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976). The "Kingpin" statute is part of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention & Control Act of 1970, P.L. 91-513. The purpose of the Comprehensive
Act is to deal with the menace of drug abuse through increased efforts to prevent drug
abuse and rehabilitate drug addicts; to enhance law enforcement aspects of drug abuse
prevention and control; and to provide an overall balanced scheme of criminal penalties for
drug related offenses. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4567.
" 639 F.2d at 180. Along with the RICO and Kingpin convictions, the jury also con-
victed Webster for conspiracy to violate narcotics laws, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976); unlawful use
of the telephone, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1976); and interstate travel in aid of an unlawful activ-
ity, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1976).
" 639 F.2d at 180-81. Along with the RICO and Kingpin sentences, Webster received
thirty years for conspiracy to violate narcotics laws; eight years on each of the eighteen
counts of unlawful use of the telephone; and five years on each of three counts of interstate
travel in aid of unlawful activity. Id. All of Webster's sentences were to run concurrently
with the fifty year sentence under the Kingpin statute. Id.
,1 639 F.2d at 181.
18 See id. at 181, 182.
" See id. at 182, 184. Section 1962(c) prohibits one employed or associated with any in-
terstate enterprise from conducting or participating in the affairs of that enterprise
"through a pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976); see note 6 supra. The
crucial RICO element is the "enterprise." Note, The RICO "Enterprise" Element- Does it
Encompass Associations Formed for Illegitimate Purposes?, 57 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 765, 767
(1981) [hereinafter cited as RICO Enterprise Element]. RICO defines enterprise to include
"any individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976);
see United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980) (county sheriff's department
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way.'8 In response, the Government argued that the Fourth Circuit
should decline to review the merits of Webster's challenge to his RICO
conviction by applying the concurrent sentence doctrine.19
The Government also responded to the merits of Webster's chal-
lenge to his RICO conviction.2 The prosecution argued that it need not
is enterprise); United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, 450 (3d Cir. 1979) (Philadelphia Traf-
fic Court is enterprise); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1092 (3d Cir. 1977) (state
agency responsible for enforcing tax laws is enterprise), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978);
United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1073 (5th Cir. 1977) (organized prostitution activ-
ity falls within definition of enterprise), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978); United States v.
Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 416 (5th Cir. 1977) (city police department is enterprise), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v. Dozier, 493 F. Supp. 554, 554 (M.D. La. 1980) (Louisiana
Department of Agriculture is enterprise); United States v. Sisk, 476 F. Supp. 1061, 1062-63
(M.D. Tenn. 1979) (state governor's office is enterprise); United States v. Barber, 476 F.
Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. W.Va. 1979) (West Virginia Alcohol Beverage Control Commission is
enterprise). In Webster I, the prosecution alleged that the Club was the enterprise whose
affairs Webster conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity. 639 F.Zd at 184 n.4.
Until the Supreme Court decided the issue in United States v. Turkette,
101 S. Ct. 2514 (1981), the circuits were divided on whether the term "enterprise" included
illegal enterprises or was restricted to legitimate organizations. See 639 F.2d at 184 n.4. See
generally RICO Enterprise Elemen supra, at 75-93. In Turkette, the Court decided that
the term "enterprise" includes both letigimate and illegitimate enterprises. 101 S. Ct. at
2527.
" 639 F.2d at 184.
1 Id. at 182-83. Courts originally viewed the concurrent sentence doctrine as a
jurisdictional bar to review of challenges to multiple convictions carrying concurrent
sentences when an appellate court upheld a conviction on a count carrying a longer
sentence. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 788-89 (1969). The doctrine originated in
Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813). In Locke, the Government condemned
the defendant's cargo under a libel containing eleven counts. Id. at 339-40. The Court refus-
ed to consider the former owner's challenges to all eleven counts because it found the fourth
count valid. Id. at 344. In Claassen v. United States, the Court held that if the trial court
validly had convicted the defendant on any one count of an indictment upon which a single
general sentence rested, then an appellate court need not consider the other counts. 142
U.S. 140, 146-47 (1891). In Hirabayashi v. United States, the defendant had received two
three-month concurrent sentences upon his conviction for two different offenses. 320 U.S.
81, 83-84 (1943). The Court ceased its review after affirming only one of the convictions find-
ing consideration of the challenge to the other unnecessary. Id. at 105.
The Supreme Court has applied the concurrent sentence doctrine haphazardly. See
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. at 798. In Putnam v. United States, the Court ignored the doc-
trine and decided an issue that affected only one count, even though the trial court had im-
posed concurrent- sentences. 162 U.S. 687, 708-15 (1896). In Roviaro v. United States, the
Court implied that the doctrine was discretionary when it stated that a reviewing court
may affirm a judgment if the conviction on either count was valid. 353 U.S. 53, 59 n.6 (1957).
In Barenblatt v. United States, however, the Court implied that the doctrine was a jurisdic-
tional bar when it stated that a reviewing court must uphold a general sentence based on
multiple convictions if any one count is sustainable. 360 U.S. 109, 115 (1959).
The Supreme Court settled some of the confusion surrounding the concurrent sentence
doctrine in Benton v. Maryland when it held explicitly that the doctrine is not a jurisdic-
tional bar to review. 395 U.S. at 791. At the same time, however, the Court recognized that
the doctrine continues to exist as a rule of judicial convenience. Id.
= 639 F.2d at 184.
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prove that the narcotics racketeering promoted the Club's affairs.2' The
Government contended that RICO section 1962(c)l requires only a
"substantial nexus" between the racketeering and the conduct of the
enterprise's affairs." The Government thus reasoned that evidence
showing that the Club promoted the drug business was legally sufficient
to support a conviction under section 1962(c).24
After upholding Webster's conviction under the Kingpin statute, the
Fourth Circuit declined to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine and
chose to review the RICO conviction.' The Webster I court reasoned
21 Id.
18 U'S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). See note 6 supra.
639 F.2d at 184.
z' Id. The Government's evidence supporting the RICO count showed that Webster
constantly used Club facilities for his drug dealing business. Id. The evidence tended to
show, however, that the Club promoted the drug business and not that the drug business, or
funds from the drug business, promoted the Club. Id. The Government admitted in its brief
that the evidence tended to show that the Club promoted the drug business and not the
reverse. Id. In fact, the theory of the Government's case was that the Club promoted the
drug business. Id. Under the substantial nexus test an appellate court presumably must sus-
tain a RICO conviction if the evidence showed that the Club promoted the drug business.
' 639 F.2d at 183. Before the Fourth Circuit decided not to apply the concurrent
sentence doctrine to the RICO conviction, the Webster I court upheld Webster's conviction
under the Kingpin statute. Id. at 180-82. Webster made several challenges to his conviction
under the Kingpin statute. Id. First, he claimed that the trial judge's jury instructions
regarding the Kingpin statute were improper. Id. at 181. The judge had instructed the jury
that the crime of interstate travel in aid of unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1976),
could supply a foundation for a Kingpin statute conviction. Id. The Government had charged
Webster with interstate travel violations elsewhere in the indictment. Id. The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the instruction was erroneous because the Kingpin statute did not list inter-
state travel in aid of unlawful activity as one of the crimes whose violation could form the
basis of a Kingpin statute violation. Id. The Webster I court held the error harmless,
however, because to convict for an interstate travel violation the trial court must find a
business enterprise involving violations of statutes that the Kingpin statute lists as statutes
whose violation can form the basis of a Kingpin conviction. Id.
Second, Webster argued that the trial judge improperly had repeated and highlighted
the elements of a Kingpin statute violation in reference to Webster. Id. The Fourth Circuit
held that the contention was frivolous. Id. The court held that the trial judge properly had
employed the pedagogical technique of first providing an overview, then a summary, and
finally adding details. Id. The court stated that the judge's clarity regarding the Kingpin
statute may have been a disadvantage to Webster, but not a disadvantage about which he
could complain. Id. at 181-82.
Finally, Webster argued that the Kingpin statute's requirement that the defendant
receive substantial income or resources from his drug operation in unconstitutionally vague.
639 F.2d at 182; see 21 U.S.C. § 848(b}(2)(B) (1976). The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument
adopting the reasoning of United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979). See 639 F.2d at 182. In Valenzuela, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that the statute would have been valid even without the substantial income limitation. 596
F.2d at 1368. No reason exists, therefore, to invalidate the statute because Congress chose
to provide some protection to small-scale drug dealers. Id.
Webster also had challenged the legality of certain wiretapes that had provided almost
all of the evidence used against Webster. 639 F.2d at 177-80. Webster contended that
government agents violated the Maryland wiretapping statute by failing to show that they
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that it could not predict with reasonable certainty that no adverse col-
lateral consequences from an unreviewed RICO conviction would re-
dound to Webster . 2  The Fourth Circuit refused to place the risk of
future adverse collateral consequences upon Webster.' Instead, the
Fourth Circuit exercised its discretion to review the RICO count
because of the possible stigma to the defendant stemming from an
unreviewed racketeering conviction.
2 8
had tried alternative methods of investigation which had failed, were unlikely to succeed, or
were too dangerous, Id. at 179. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN § 10-408(a)(3); 18
U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1976). Webster argued that the police should have tried grand jury sub-
poenas, or threatened reluctant informants with contempt, or offered them immunity. 639
F.2d at 179. In addition, the government could have tried to infiltrate Webster's operation.
Id. The Fourth Circuit rejected Webster's contention that the government agents violated
the Maryland wiretapping law. Id. The court argued-that Webster's suggested techniques
were speculative. Id.
" 639 F.2d at 183. The Webster I court assumed, without holding, that the concurrent
sentence doctrine may apply provided the court can foresee with reasonable certainty that
no adverse collateral consequences from an unreviewed conviction would redound to
Webster. Id. at 182-83.
2 639 F.2d at 183.
' Id., quoting, United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1361 n.2 (8th Cir. -1980). The
possibility of stigma to the defendant resulting from an unreviewed criminal conviction is
only one adverse collateral consequence of affirming a conviction on the basis of the concur-
rent sentence doctrine to which courts point in refusing to apply the doctrine. Several other
possible adverse collateral consequences may follow from an unreviewed criminal convic-
tion. First, the appellant may find that his chances for parole decrease or that he will have
to wait longer before becoming eligible for parole. See United States v. Holder, 560 F.2d
953, 956 (8th Cir. 1977) (parole guidelines necessitate reassessment of concurrent sentence
doctrine). The United States Parole Commission has promulgated guidelines governing the
granting of parole. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.60 (1980). Parole boards consider a number of fac-:
tors including the "offense severity rating" and the "salient factor score." Id. § 2.20. The
Parole Commission has established severity ratings for various offenses, depending upon
their character, and a suggested time for parole that corresponds to the severity rating. Id.
The higher the severity rating, the longer the prisoner must wait for parole eligibility. Id.
The Commission permits a parole board to increase the offense severity level if an offense
behavior involved multiple separate offenses. Id. § 2.20 n.D. An unreviewed conviction,
therefore, may increase a prisoner's offense severity rating and thereby increase the time
he must serve before becoming eligible for parole. Parole boards also use the "salient factor
score" to determine a prisoner's eligibility for parole. Id. § 2.20. While the "offense severity
rating" establishes a minimum period of imprisonment before a prisoner becomes eligible
for parole, the "salient factor score" can increase that time. United States v. Smith, 601 F.2d
972, 976 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979). The "salient factor score" is based in
part on the number of the defendant's previous convictions. United.States v. Holder, 560
F.2d at 956. An unreviewed conviction, however, should not affect the prisoner's "salient
factor score" adversely because the Parole Commission considers multiple offenses arising
from a single offense behavior as a single conviction for rating purposes. Id.
A second possible adverse collateral consequence flowing from an unreviewed convic-
tion is that the unreviewed conviction may form the basis of an enhanced sentence under an
"habitual criminar statute. United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952, 960 (2d Cir. 1980). Third,
a prosecutor possibly could use the unreviewed conviction to impeach the appellant's
character at a future trial or introduce the conviction as a prior similar act. Id. Finally, an
unreviewed conviction may reduce the appellant's chance for a pardon. Id.
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The Supreme Court has not given the federal circuit courts clear
direction regarding the use of the concurrent sentence doctrine.' In Ben-
ton v. Maryland" the Court held that the doctrine is not a jurisdictional
bar to reviewing a challenged conviction when a reviewing court has sus-
tained another conviction carrying a longer concurrent sentence. 1 The
Benton court stated, however, that the concurrent sentence doctrine
continues to exist as a rule of judicial convenience.2 The Court applied
the doctrine after Benton in Barnes v. United States.' The Barnes
Court, as a matter of discretion, declined to review four of six courts for
which Barnes had received concurrent sentences. 4
Use of the concurrent sentence doctrine in the federal circuit courts
varies from circuit to circuit. 5 The doctrine remains strong in the Ninth
Circuit. 6 The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to hold expressly that the
doctrine is constitutional. The Eighth Circuit also has advocated use of
See text accompanying notes 30-34 infra.
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
3, Id. at 791.
3 Id. Before Benton, the Supreme Court applied the concurrent sentence doctrine in-
termittently and haphazardly. See note 19 supra.
3 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
1 Id. at 848 n.16. In Barnes, the trial court convicted the defendant on two counts of
possessing United States Treasury checks stolen from the mails, knowing them to be stolen,
two counts of forging the checks, and two counts of uttering the checks, knowing the en-
dorsements to be forged. Id. at 838. The trial judge sentenced Barnes to six concurrent
three-year prison terms. Id.
The trial judge had instructed the jury that from a showing of unexplained possession
of recently stolen property the jury reasonably may infer and find that the person in posses-
sion knew the property had been stolen. Id. at 938-40. The defendant challenged the con-
stitutional validity of this common law inference. See id. at 838. The Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the inference and affirmed Barnes' convictions for possession of stolen
Treasury checks stolen from the mails, knowing them to be stolen. Id. at 841, 846.
After upholding Barnes' convictions under two counts of the indictment, the Court
declined to review the defendant's challenges to the other four convictions. Id. at 848. The
Barnes Court advanced no rationale supporting its decision to apply the concurrent
sentence doctrine. See id. The Court acknowledged that affirmance of the two counts did
not moot the issues raised by Barnes' challenge to the remaining four counts. Id. at 848 n.16
citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The Supreme Court simply declined as a
discretionary matter to reach those issues. 412 U.S. at 848 n.16.
I See The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, supra note 1, at 289-95; text accompanying
notes 36-47 infra.
I See generally Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, supra note 1. See, e.g., United States
v. Cheung, 504 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1974) (reviewing court need not consider challenge to
defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting commission of offenses for which the prin-
cipal was acquitted when reviewing court upholds conspiracy conviction and trial judge had
ordered concurrent sentences); United States v. Aviles, 439 F.2d 709, 709 (9th Cir.) (too
many counts in indictment not prejudice since judge imposed concurrent sentences), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); United States v. Martinez, 429 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1970)
(court may apply concurrent sentence doctrine even when evidence against defendant on
challenged count is thin).
31 Van Geldern v. Field, 498 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir. 1974).
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the doctrine in the interests of judicial economy. 8 Support for the doc-
trine in the Eighth Circuit, however, has not been unwaivering29 The
Fifth Circuit also has supported use of the doctrine."
The Seventh Circuit virtually has abandoned the concurrent sen-
tence doctrine, reasoning that Benton generally requires a reviewing
court to review all challenged convictions.4' Similarly, the Second Circuit
looks disfavorably upon the doctrine, reasoning in one case that the doc-
trine's judicial convenience is illusory because the reviewing court still
must undertake an analysis to determine whether the concurrent sen-
tence doctrine applies.42 The Sixth Circuit also has been reluctant to
apply the doctrine.43
The District of Columbia Circuit takes a novel approach to the con-
current sentence doctrine.4 This circuit applies the doctrine, but instead
of summarily affirming convictions subject to the doctrine's application,
the D.C. Circuit vacates the convictions.45 Summarily vacating the con-
' See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 548 F.2d 228, 233 (8th Cir. 1977) (concurrent
sentence doctrine serves interest of judicial economy); Morrison v. United States, 491 F.2d
344, 347 (8th Cir. 1974) (concurrent sentence doctrine applies when adverse collateral conse-
quences are remote).
" See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 541 F.2d 190, 194 (8th Cir. 1976) (concurrent
sentence doctrine should be applied more cautiously today than before Benton), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978); United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir. 1975) (doc-
trine not applied when possibly erroneous admission of evidence on one count may have af-
fected other counts); United States v. Belt, 516 F.2d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1975) (doctrine not
applicable when crimes charged are serious and differing in substance because adverse col-
lateral consequences from erroneous conviction probable), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 (1976).
,0 See, e.g., United States v. Muller, 550 F.2d 1375, 1380 (5th Cir. 1977) (having affirm-
ed appellant's conviction on conspiracy count, concurrent sentence doctrine makes deter-
mination of sufficiency of evidence under remaining substantive count unnecessary); United
States v. Ragano, 520 F.2d 1191, 1204 (5th Cir. 1975) (concurrent sentence doctrine makes
determination of legality of conviction on other counts unnecessary), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
905 (1976); Hawkins v. United States, 458 F.2d 1153, 1155 (5th Cir. 1972) (consideration
whether one conviction void because of double jeopardy foreclosed by doctrine); United
States v. Bigham, 421 F.2d 1344, 1346 (5th Cir.) (Benton *does not require review of all
counts), cert denied, 400 U.S. 818 (1970).
" See, e.g., United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 140 (7th Cir.) (concurrent sentence
doctrine inapplicable unless no possibility of adverse collateral consequences), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 949 (1972); United States v. Kilpatrick, 458 F.2d 864, 867 (7th Cir. 1972) (validity of
concurrent sentence doctrine diminished by Benton); Davie v. United States, 447 F.2d 480,
481 (7th Cir. 1971) (Benton casts doubt on continuing validity of concurrent sentence doc-
trine).
"2 United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952, 960 (2d Cir. 1980). See United States v. Ruf-
fin, 575 F.2d 346, 361 (2d Cir. 1978) (since Benton, Second Circuit generally has reviewed all
counts despite the concurrent sentence doctrine).
," See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 533 F.2d 1387, 1390 (6th Cir. 1976) (declining to
apply doctrine but not specifying particular adverse collateral consequences feared); Gentry
v. United States, 533 F.2d 998, 1001 (6th Cir. 1976) (same).
" See text accompanying notes 45 & 46 infra.
" See, e.g., United States v. Gower, 503 F.2d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 413 U.S. 914 (1974); United States v. Hill, 470 F.2d 361, 366-68 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
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current conviction has the advantage of simultaneously promoting
judicial economy and eliminating the risk to the defendant of adverse
collateral consequences from an unreviewed conviction." Finally, the
First and Third Circuit have not considered many concurrent sentence
cases, and the Tenth Circuit has not discussed the doctrine in depth.47
The status of the concurrent sentence doctrine in the Fourth Circuit
is unsettled.48 In Close v. United States,49 the Fourth Circuit refused to
apply the doctrine even though the court conceded that almost no
possibility existed that adverse collateral consequences from the
unreviewed conviction would redound to Close." In United States v.
United States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Other circuits occasionally have
vacated the concurrent conviction automatically instead of summarily affirming the concur-
rent sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 538 F.2d 461, 466 (1st Cir. 1976); United
States v. Fishbein, 446 F.2d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972).
46 United States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
, See Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, supra note 1, at 290, 294. The First Circuit
generally has declined to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine. See United States v.
Moynagh, 566 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1977) (refusing to apply concurrent sentence doctrine
because court satisfied that future adverse collateral consequences possibly could affect
defendant); United States v. Benthiem, 456 F.2d 165, 167 (1st Cir. 1972) (declining to apply
doctrine without discussing why). But see Vanetzian v. Hall, 562 F.2d 88, 90-91 (1st Cir.
1977) (applying concurrent sentence doctrine on collateral attack when petitioner failed to
point to any adverse collateral consequences and the court could not find any). The Third
Circuit apparently views application of the doctrine as within the court's discretion. See
United States v. Keller, 512 F.2d 182, 185 n.8 (3d Cir. 1975) (electing as matter of discretion
not to apply concurrent sentence doctrine). The Tenth Circuit has not discussed the doctrine
at length. See United States v. Gamble, 541 F.2d 873, 877 (10th Cir. 1976) (declining without
advancing rationale to consider challenges to convictions that even if successful would have
no effect on defendant's total prison sentence); United States v. Bath, 504 F.2d 456, 457 (10th
Cir. 1974) (applying doctrine when court unable to discern possibility of adverse collateral
consequences). But see United States v. Masters, 484 F.2d 1251, 1253 (10th Cir. 1973) (sum-
marily rejecting Government's argument that concurrent sentence doctrine applies); United
States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, 1010-11 (10th Cir.) (refusing to apply concurrent
sentence doctrine noting Benton stated that real harm could result from unreviewed concur-
rent convictions), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 67 (1971).
48 See text accompanying notes 49-54 infra.
'9 450 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1068 (1972).
o 450 F.2d at 155. In Close, a federal district court had convicted Close in 1949 of two
counts of armed robbery and a single count of interstate transportation of stolen property.
Id. at 153. His sentence for interstate transportation was to run concurrently with his
longer sentence for bank robbery. Id. In 1961 Close was paroled. Id. Later, Close par-
ticipated in other bank robberies and a trial court sent him to prison again. Id. The Board of
Pardons and Parole lodged a detainer against Close based on the unserved portion of his
1949 sentences. Id. A detainer notifies incarcerating authorities that other authorities want
the prisoner. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, at 1119
(5th ed. 1980). The detainer requests that the incarcerating authorities notify the authorities
desiring custody of the prisoner's release date so the authorities desiring custody can ar-
range to pick the prisoner up at the institution. Id. In response to the detainer, Close filed
an application to vacate his 1949 sentences. 450 F.2d at 155.
Close claimed that the admission into evidence at his 1949 trial of the oral confessions
of his co-defendants, neither of whom testified, deprived him of his opportunity to cross-
examine the co-defendants. Id. Close pointed to Bruton v. Maryland, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968),
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Truong Dinh Hung,5' however, the Fourth Circuit applied the doctrine,
reasoning that no substantial likelihood existed that adverse collateral
consequences from the unreviewed conviction would redound to
Truong.52 The Webster I court followed Close and refused to apply the
doctrine.' In Webster I the court reasoned that it should not apply the
doctrine because the stigma flowing from an unreviewed conviction for
the offense of racketeering may affect the defendant adversely. 4
The Webster I court correctly declined to apply the concurrent
sentence doctrine. The Fourth Circuit's rationale, however, is unsatisfac-
tory. The court reasoned that it should review the RICO conviction
because, otherwise, the stigma flowing from an unreviewed conviction
for the offense of racketeering may affect Webster adversely.5 Webster,
however, stood convicted under the Kingpin statute as the leader of a
large-scale narcotics distribution network." The trial court had sen-
tenced Webster to a total of 259 years in prison for his illegal narcotics
dealings. Under the facts, Webster could suffer no marginal stigma
in which the Supreme Court held that the admission into evidence of a co-defendant's con-
fession, when the co-defendant does not testify and is, therefore, not subject to cross ex-
amination, violates the defendant's right to confrontation that the sixth amendment guaran-
tees. 450 F.2d at 153. Close also directed the Fourth Circuit's attention to Roberts v. Russel,
392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968), in which the Court ordered lower courts to apply Bruton retroac-
tively. 450 F.2d at 153. The Close court held that the admission of the evidence regarding
the bank robbery charges was harmless error but reversed Close's interstate transporta-
tion conviction. IM at 154-55.
The Close court considered the merits of a claim subject to concurrent sentence doc-
trine abstention even though the court stated that the appellant most likely would sustain
no prejudice from disregarding the error underlying the interstate transportation convic-
tion. Id. at 155. The Fourth Circuit noted that the defendant was an unlikely candidate for
either parole or a pardon. IM The Close court, however, could find no legal reason not to
review the interstate transportation conviction. Id.
5 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id- at 932. A federal district court had convicted Truong for espionage and espionage
related offenses. Id at 911. The district court also convicted Truong of taking a thing of
value, classified information, from the United States. Id- The trial judge sentenced Truong
to 15 years in prison for his espionage conviction and to 5 years for his taking a thing of
value conviction. Id. at 931. The trial judge ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Id.
On appeal, a Fourth Circuit panel unanimously affirmed Truong's espionage conviction. Id
After affirming Truong's espionage conviction, the majority applied the concurrent
sentence doctrine to avoid reaching the merits of Truong's challenge to his taking a thing of
value conviction. Id at 931-32 (Russell, J., concurring and dissenting); see Note, The Foreign
Intelligence Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 551, 560-63
(1981) (criticizing Truong court's application of concurrent sentence doctrine). Judge Winter
wrote a strong dissent in Truong on the concurrent sentence doctrine issue. 629 F.2d at
922-23 (Winter, J., dissenting). Judge Winter argued that Close interred the doctrine in the
Fourth Circuit. Id at 922.
639 F.2d at 183.
Id.; see text accompanying note 28 supra.
639 F.2d at 182-83; see text accompanying notes 28 & 54 supra.
5, 639 F.2d at 180; see text accompanying notes 12 & 13 supra.
, See 639 F.2d at 181; note 14 supra.
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from an unreviewed RICO conviction. The Webster I court should have
examined the possibility of adverse collateral consequences more closely
before declining to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine." Further-
more, because the Webster I court's rationale is arguably suspect and
the decision lacks detailed discussion about the doctrine's applicability,
the Webster I decision leaves the status of the concurrent sentence doc-
trine in the Fourth Circuit unclear. 9
A better approach for reviewing courts facing a concurrent sentence
doctrine issue is to presume that adverse collateral consequences flow
from any conviction. The Supreme Court suggested in Sibron v. New
York"0 that some adverse collateral consequences accompany virtually
all criminal convictions.' A reviewing court should, therefore, either
review or vacate without review every concurrent conviction that an
appellant challenges even if reversals would not reduce the appellant's
total prison sentence.62 This approach eliminates the risk to the defen-
dant of adverse collateral consequences from an. unreviewed conviction'
and is consistent with Supreme Court precedent that a court should
presume adverse collateral consequences flow from any conviction. 3
Although the Fourth Circuit's decision not to apply the concurrent
sentence doctrine is proper, the court's rationale is unsatisfactory. 4- The
Webster I court should have undertaken a closer examination of possible
adverse collateral consequences to Webster of an unreviewed RICO con-
viction before declining to apply the doctrine.' A better approach is to
abandon the concurrent sentence doctrine, insofar as it provides for sum-
marily affirming a concurrent conviction, by presuming that adverse col-
lateral consequences flow from any criminal conviction. 6 This approach
is consistent with the principle that the Supreme Court enunciated in
Sibron v. New York.67
I The Webster I court should have looked at the effect an unreviewed RICO convic-
tion might have on Webster's chances for parole. See note 28 supra. If the Webster court's
decision not to apply the doctrine is not sustainable on the ground of possible stigma, the
decision may be sustainable on the ground that an unreviewed RICO conviction would affect
Webster's chances for parole adversely. See United States v. Smith, 601 F.2d 972, 976 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979); United States v. Holder, 560 F.2d 953, 956 (8th Cir.
1977); note 28 supra.
11 Since 1980, two Fourth Circuit cases, Truong and Webster, have reached opposite
results on the applicability of the concurrent sentence doctrine. Compare United States v.
Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 931 (4th Cir. 1980) (doctrine applied because no substantial
likelihood of adverse collateral consequences) with United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174,
183 (4th Cir. 1981) (doctrine not applied because of possible stigma stemming from
unreviewed racketeering conviction).
69 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
Id. at 55 citing Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 358 (1957).
62 See text accompanying notes 45 & 46 supra.
See text accompanying notes 46 & 60-61 supra.
See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
See text accompanying note 58 supra.
See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
392 U.S. 40 (1968); see text accompanying note 61 supra.
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After refusing to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine, the Fourth
Circuit reviewed the merits of Webster's challenge to his RICO convic-
tion.68 The court accepted Webster's argument that RICO section 1962(c)
obligated the Government to prove that the narcotics racketeering pro-
moted the Club's affairs.69 The Fourth Circuit rejected the Government's
argument that section 1962(c) requires only a substantial nexus between
the racketeering activity and the enterprise, regardless of the direction
in which the assistance flows. 0 The Webster I court attached directional
significance to the word "through" in section 1962(c)'s prohibition
against conducting the affairs of any enterprise "through" a pattern of
racketeering activity.71 The court held that RICO section 1962(c) is not
violated unless assistance flows from the racketeering activity toward
the enterprise.72 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, reversed Webster's
RICO conviction because the Government's evidence proved only that
the enterprise, the Club, promoted the racketeering activity, the drug
business.73
On rehearing (Webster I1),74 however, the same Fourth Circuit panel
that decided Webster I reconsidered its first interpretation of RICO sec-
tion 1962(c) and in a curious aboutface reinstated Webster's RICO convic-
tion." In reversing its own recent interpretation of section 1962(c), the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the proper question should have been
6 639 F.2d at 183. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976), is part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA) Pub.
L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.). See
RICO Enterprise Element, supra note 17, at 765.,OCCA is a comprehensive legislative
package that Congress designed to eradicate organized crime in the United States. Id.
RICO's role in OCCA's complex statutory scheme is to eliminate organized crime's infiltra-
tion of legitimate business. Note, Elliot v..United States, Conspiracy Law and the Judicial
Pursuit of Organized Crime through RICO, 65 VA. L. REY. 109, 109 (1979). See also note 6
supra.
In addition to reviewing and reversing Webster's RICO conviction, the Fourth Circuit
in Webster I reversed Webster's conviction for conspiracy to violate narcotics laws. 639
F.2d at 182; see note 13 supra. Webster argued that conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws
is a lesser included offense of the Kingpin statute, and therefore, sentencing for both crimes
violates the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. 639 F.2d at 182. The
Fourth Circuit noted that two circuits have held that conspiracy to violate the^ narcotics
laws is a lesser included offense of the Kingpin statute. Id. citing United States v. Striklin,
591 F.2d 1112, 1123 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979); United States v. Sperling,
560 F.2d 1050, 1055 (2d Cir. 1977). The Fourth Circuit had no occasion to decide the issue
because at oral argument the Government admitted that conspiracy to violate narcotics
laws is a lesser included offense of the Kingpin statute. 639 F.2d at 182. The Webster I court
held, therefore, that since the Kingpin conviction was valid, the conspiracy conviction must
fall. Id.
" 639 F.2d at 183-86.
70 Id
71 See id. at 184-85; text accompanying notes 72-73 infra.
7 639 F.2d at 183-86.
Id. at 185-86; see text accompanying notes 9-10 & 18 supra.
7 United States v. Webster, Nos. 79-5204 & 79-5240, slip op. (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 1982).
7 Id., slip op. at 6-7.
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whether Webster conducted the Club's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity, not whether the racketeering activity advanced or
promoted the Club.76 The Webster 11 court stated that "conducted",
under section 1962(c), means the regular and repeated carrying on of af-
fairs.' Since the record showed that Webster regularly used Club
facilities and personnel in his drug dealing business,78 the Fourth Circuit
concluded that Webster had conducted the Club's affairs through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity.79 Webster II, distilled to its holding, is the
Fourth Circuit's adoption of the substantial nexus test for RICO section
1962(c) cases."
The only court before Webster I to attach directional significance to
the work "through" in RICO section 1962(c) was the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Nerone.8' Other courts interpreting section 1962(c) have
commented upon the general section 1962(c) requirement of some con-
nection between the racketeering activity and the affairs of the enter-
prise, but not upon the specific operative requirements of that interrela-
tionship.82 In United States v. Stofsky,83 the United States District Court
for Southern District of New York implied that the racketeering activity
need have no connection to the enterprise's affairs.84 The Ninth Circuit
held in United States v. Campanale" that section 1962(c) requires some
connection between the racketeering activity and the affairs of the
enterprise, but the court did not elaborate further.88 The Fifth Circuit, in
United States v. Rubin,87 specifically declined to define the operative re-
quirements of the interrelationship between the racketeering activity
and the affairs of the enterprise stating only that the court assumed sec-
tion 1962(c) required some relationship between the two.8 Finally, in
7 Id., slip op. at 4-5 (emphasis the court's).
Id., slip op. at 5.
78 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
Nos. 79-5204 & 79-5240, slip op. at 5.
See id., slip op. at 4-5; text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
sI 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978). In Nerone, the Seventh
Circuit reversed a RICO section 1962(c) conviction because the Government failed to prove
that an illegal gambling operation, the charged racketeering activity, advanced the in-
terests of a trailer park, the charged enterprise, which operated as a front for the gambling
operation. 563 F.2d at 851-52.
See text accompanying notes 83-89 infra.
409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975).
409 F. Supp. at 613. In Stofsky, the defendants challenged the constitutionality of
RICO § 1962(c) arguing that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to set
forth the degree and intensity of the relationship required between the racketeering activi-
ty and the operation of the enterprise's affairs. Id. at 612. The Stofsky court rejected defen-
dant's argument stating that the statute is violated if the defendant participated in racketeer-
ing activity during the course of his association with the enterprise. Id. at 613.
518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 358.
'5 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 990. In Rubin, the defendant claimed that the trial judge's jury instructions
concerning RICO § 1962(c) were defective. Id. at 989. Rubin argued that the Government
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United States v. Mandel," the Fourth Circuit stated that section 1962(c)
requires some connection between the racketeering activity and the af-
fairs of the enterprise. 0
Although the Webster I court's interpretation of "through" in RICO
section 1962(c) is reasonable," the court's rationale was questionable.
The Fourth Circuit cited the language of section 1962(c) to support the
conclusion that the racketeering activity must advance the enterprise,
but the court never explained satisfactorily how or why the statutory
language supports the conclusion.2 Additionally, the Webster I court
cited the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mandel to support the view that
section 1962(c) requires more than a substantial connection between the
enterprise and the racketeering activity. 3 Mandel, however, did not re-
quire more than a substantial nexus between the two elements. 4
must prove under § 1962(c) that the racketeering furthered his ability to onduct the enter-
prise's affairs. Id. The Government argued that it need only prove that the defendant par-
ticipated in racketeering activity during the course of his association with the enterprise.
Id. at 989-90. The trial judge compromised by reading the statutory language to the jury.
See id. at 990; note 6 supra. The Fifth Circuit held only that the trial judge did not commit
reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that "through" means "by means of." Id.
The Rubin court noted that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the
racketeering activity promoted the defendant's position in the enterprise. Id.
" 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 609 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
" In Mandel, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the meaning of the words "conduct or par-
ticipate" in RICO § 1962(c)'s prohibition against conducting or participating in the conduct of
an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 591 F.2d at 1374-76; see
note 6 supra. The Mandel panel held that the "conduct or participate" language requires
some connection between the racketeering activity and the affairs of the enterprise. Id. at
1375-76. To support its conclusion the Mandel court looked to the word "through" in section
1962(c). Id- The Fourth Circuit stated that use of the word "through" in section 1962(c)
shows that the statute requires proof of some connection between the racketeering activity
and the conducting or operating of the business. Id. at 1375.
91 See Note, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IowA L.
REv. 837, 874 (1980) (ANerone court's approach is sensible).
" See 639 F.2d at 184-85. The Webster I court stated that the word "through" sug-
gests that the statute applies only when racketeering activity advances the enterprise but
not when the enterprise promotes the racketeering activity. Id.
3 See id
u See 591 F.2d 1347, 1374-76. The Mandel opinion contains broad dicta on RICO §
1962(c). See id. at 1374-76. The Mandel court stated that use of the word "through" in sec-
tion 1962(c) seems to require the Government to prove some connection between the
racketeering activity and the.operation of the business. Id. at 1375. The Fourth Circuit fur-
ther stated that the connection must be shown if the word "through" is to have any mean-
ing. Id. The court also said that without the word "through" a person who took income
derived from a legitimate business and then used the money to participate in racketeering
activity would be guilty of a RICO violation. Id. The Mandel court then said that Congress
did not intend to sweep so broadly. Id.
The conclusion that the Mandel court did not attach directional significance to the
word "through" in section 1962(c) is clear in view of two features of the opinion. First, after
the court's discussion of the meaning of "through" in section 1962(c), the Fourth Circuit
recognized that United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) had reached
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Mandel, therefore, is direct support for the conclusion that the Fourth
Circuit reached in Webster II, rather than Webster L
The Webster I court's interpretation of "through" in RICO section
1962(c) was supportable, however, on two grounds that the Fourth Cir-
cuit did not advance. 5 First, the Supreme Court has stated that courts
should resolve any ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
in favor of the defendant. 6 In Webster I, therefore, the Fourth Circuit
correctly resolved the ambiguity concerning the construction of the
word "through" in section 1962(c) in favor of Webster. Second, the prin-
ciple of federalism supports the Webster I court's construction of section
1962(c). The Supreme Court has stated that courts should not assume
that Congress has altered significantly the federal-state balance unless
it has clearly stated its intention to do so." The RICO statute is a
substantial federal intrusion into traditional state criminal jurisdiction.98
The Fourth Circuit in Webster I, therefore, correctly chose the inter-
pretation of section 1962(c) involving the least amount of federal intru-
sion into state criminal jurisdiction.
In Webster I the Fourth'Circuit correctly declined to apply the con-
current sentence doctrine.99 The status of the doctrine in the Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, is unsettled in view of the Fourth Circuit's decision a year
earlier, in Truong, to apply the doctrine. °10 The Webster I court's ra-
tionale for declining to apply the doctrine was unsatisfactory.'' The
court should have undertaken a closer examination of possible adverse
collateral consequences to Webster from an unreviewed RICO conviction
before declining to apply the doctrine.0 2 A' better approach is to presume
a contrary conclusion for the meaning of the word "through:' See 591 F.2d at 1376. Stofsky
held that the prosecution need show no connection at all between the racketeering activity
and the enterprise. See 409 F. Supp. at 613; text accompanying note 84 supra. Had the
Mandel court attached directional significance to the word "through" in section 1962(c), the
court would have cited United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197, 199 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd,
625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978) as contrary authority. Both
Dennis and Field held that RICO section 1962(c) does not require proof regarding the ad-
vancementf the enterprise's affairs by the racketeering activities. Second, the only ques-
tion here relevant that Mandel addressed was the propriety of the trial judge's conclusion
that RICO section 1962(c) requires proof of some connection between the racketeering ac-
tivity and the operation of the enterprise. See 591 F.2d at 1374. The Fourth Circuit conclud-
ed that the trial judge had properly construed the statute. Id. at 1375.
"7 See text accompanying notes 96-98 infra.
" Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81,
83 (1955); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917); see United States v. Sutton,
605 F.2d 260, 269-70 (6th Cir. 1979).
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
" United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 270.
'7 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
"7 See text accompanying notes 51-52 & 59 supra.
101 See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
"7 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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that adverse collateral consequences flow from any conviction.' 3 A
reviewing court should, therefore, either review or vacate without
review every concurrent conviction."' Although the Fourth Circuit's in-
terpretation of RICO section 1962(c) in Webster I was reasonable and
supportable, Webster 11 is more consistent with prior Fourth Circuit
discussion of section 1962(c)."'° Under Webster 11 the prosecution need
not show that the racketeering activity promoted or advanced the enter-
prise. ' Rather, the Government need show only a substantial nexus be-
tween the racketeering activity and the enterprise.' 1
MICHAEL L. KRANCER
B. Double Jeopardy: Standard for Reprose~ution
After Mistrial on Defendant's Motion
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides that a
person may not be tried twice for the same offense.' Double jeopardy
protection reflects a balancing of interests, counterposing the defendant's
desire to end his confrontation with society2 against the public's interest
'° See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
' Id.
101 See text accompanying notes 69-98 supra.
1" See text accompanying note 76 supra.
'11 See text accompanying notes 76-80 supra.
' U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in part: "[Nior shall any person
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." Id. The phrase
"life or limb" refers to any criminal penalty. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163,
170-73 (1873). The English limited double jeopardy protection to prosecutions for capital of-
fenses. Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1273
(1964) [hereinafter cited as The Reprosecution Problem]. The double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937));
see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. A double jeopardy provision is also part of the constitution or
common law of each state. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 154 (1959). The purpose of the
double jeopardy clause is to prevent the government with all of its resources and powers
from making repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby sub-
jecting him to increased expense, anxiety, embarrassment, delay, and a greater chance that,
even though innocent, the defendant win be found guilty. Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187-88 (1957). In a jury trial, a defendant acquires double jeopardy protection'when the
judge impanels and swears in the jury. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388-89 (1975).
In a non-jury trial, however, a defendant acquires double jeopardy protection when the
court begins to hear evidence. Id. See generally Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrial, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 449, 532-38 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Schulhofer].
I United 'States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971). A defendant has several interests at
stake in avoiding multiple prosecutions for the same offense. First, the defendant has a
right to a decision by the first tribunal. Downuhm v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963).
Second, the defendant has a desire to avoid harassment by the government. Green v.
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in a fair and final determination of guilt or innocence.' The double
jeopardy clause ordinarily does not bar retrial of a defendant after the
court grants a mistrial on the defendant's motion because courts deem
the request to evidence the defendant's deliberate choice not to have the
first trier of fact determine his guilt or innocence.'
In United States v. Dinitz,5 the Supreme Court broadly outlined an
exception to the defendant's choice rule. The Dinitz Court held that
prosecutorial or judicial misconduct that amounts to overreaching may
bar retrial of a defendant when the misconduct precipitates the defen-
dant's mistrial motion. Dinitz and its progeny, however, have provided
scant guidance concerning what constitutes overreaching.' As a result,
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Finally, the defendant has a desire to avoid an op-
portunity for the prosecution to improve its case through rehearsal. Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 439-40 (1970); see Note, A Resolution of the Mistrial-Dismissal Dichotomy in
Double Jeopardy Contexts, 64 IowA L. REV. 903, 909-14 (1979) [hereinafter cited as A
Resolution].
' Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689
(1949). See Note, Mistrials and Double Jeopardy, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 169, 184-89 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as AM. CRIM.]; A Resolution, supra note 2, at 914 (none of defendant's in-
terests in double jeopardy clause are absolute and court must weigh all against
government's interests). The government has an interest in giving the prosecutor a full and
fair opportunity to convict a defendant. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). The
opportunity is necessary to allow the government to convict criminally culpable people and
to vindicate societal interests in punishing those guilty of breaking laws and deterring
others from doing so. Id.; see H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 63, 63-64
(1968).
See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96, 98-100 (1978); United States v. Dinitz, 424
U.S. 600, 606-08 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485; A Resolution, supra note 2, at
914-18. In contrast to the case where the defendant requests the mistrial, a mistrial granted
at the request of the prosecutor or court threatens the defendant's right to have his trial
completed by the first tribunal. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-05 (1978). A
mistrial upon the prosecution's or court's request thus bars retrial of the defendant unless
either "manifest necessity" or "the ends of public justice" requires a retrial. United States
v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); accord, Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 501;
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 606-08; United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 480-81. See
Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 532-38.
424 U.S. 600 (1976).
6 Id. at 611. In Dinitz, the trial judge banished defense counsel from the trial pro-
ceeding. Id. at 603. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge's conduct, though perhaps
an overreaction, did not bar retrial since the judge did not intend to provoke the defendant
into requesting a mistrial nor did he intend to prejudice the defendent's chances for acquit-
tal. Id. at 611. See generally Comment, The Double Jeopardy Dilemma. Reprosecution
After Mistrial on Defendant's Motion, 63 IowA L. REV. 975, 981 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Double Jeopardy Dilemma].
See, e.g., United States v. Di Francesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980); United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82 (1978); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977). The scope of misconduct encom-
passed by the term "overreaching" remains vague. See Double Jeopardy Dilemma, supra
note 6, at 975-76. Overreaching generally refers to conduct that is more reprehensible than
mere negligence. Id. Numerous cases have attempted to define prosecutorial overreaching.
See, e.g., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 (1961) (conduct intended to secure another,
more favorable opportunity to convict); United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 141 (8th Cir.
1977) (prejudicial reading of grand jury testimony to trial jury); United States v. Kessler,
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decisions by the federal circuit courts have yielded diverse and often
contradictory results.' Several courts require a defendant to show that
the prosecutor specifically intended that his prosecutorial error provoke
a mistrial.9 Other courts find overreaching present when the prosecutor
generally intends to prejudice the defendant's chances for acquittal and
actual prejudice results. ° The state of the law is unsatisfactory because
predictability of outcome is essential to provide defendants with
reasonably certain safeguards against the burden of repeated trials and
to prevent some defendants from gaining unwarranted immunity from
prosecution.1 In United States v. Green," the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered whether the improper testimony of a federal drug
enforcement agent that elicited a defense mistrial motion constituted
prosecutorial misconduct or overreaching sufficient to bar reprosecu-
tion.1"
In Green, the government charged Green with conspiracy to
distribute heroin. 4 The prosecution's chief witness at the jury trial of
Green and his two co-defendants was a special agent of the Drug En-
forcement Administration. 5 During cross-examination of the agent,
defense counsel elicited several statements that damaged the agent's
credibility. 6 Irritated by the effective cross-examination, the agent
530 F.2d 1246, 1257 (5th Cir. 1976) (introduction of known false evidence); City of Tucson v.
Valencia, 21 Ariz. App. 148, 153, 517 P.2d 106, 111 (1973) (comments calculated to abort
trial); People v. Hathcock, 8 Cal. 3d 599, 611, 504 P.2d 476, 483 (1973) (prejudicial misconduct
intended for improper purpose); Commonwealth v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 190, 220 A.2d 859,
865, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 963 (1966) (remarks calculated to provoke mistrial). See generally
Heitz, Double Jeopardy-Mistrial Granted Upon Motion by Defendant-Standard for
Reprosecution, 42 Mo. L. REv. 485, 489 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Heitz]; Double Jeopardy
Dilemma, supra note 6, at 975-76.
8 Double Jeopardy Dilemma, supra note 6, at 981-83; see text accompanying notes
41-55 infra.
See note 43 infra.
" See note 51 infra.
" See Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 532. See generally Double Jeopardy Dilemma,
supra note 6, at 989-90.
636 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2005 (1981).
" 636 F.2d at 925.
" Id. at 926; see 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Supp. IV 1981).
" 636 F.2d at 926. Green's trial continued as to his co-defendants, who were found guil-
ty. Id. at 927 n.4.
" Id. at 926, 930-31. When called as the government's last witness, the agent testified
that heroin dealers will not distribute heroin through heavy users. Id. at 930-31. Other
evidence presented by the prosecution had depicted the defendant as a heroin distributor.
Id. The prosecutor directed the agent's attention to an entry in a ledger that indicated that
Green had received a large amount of drugs for his personal use. Id. Defense counsel then
questioned the agent concerning the form filled out at the time the defendant was arrested.
Id. The form showed that the defendant was a heroin user and that the arresting agent who
processed Green had determined this fact by the routine examination of Green's arms for
needle marks. Id. Defense counsel asked the witness if he was the agent who arrested the
defendant. Id. The witness responded that he was not. Id. Defense counsel then asked the
witness to examine the arrest form to see who signed it as the arresting officer. Id. When
the agent returned to the stand, he admitted that he had processed the defendant. Id.
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made an impermissible reference to Green's prior conviction for armed
robbery." The trial court granted the defense's motion for a mistrial. 8
The prosecution subsequently reindicted Green on the same drug
charge. 9 The defendant moved to dismiss his reindictjment on the
ground that the double jeopardy clause barred his retrial." The trial
judge denied the motion, finding that although the special agent's im-
proper statement evidenced his general intent to affect the first trial,
the double jeopardy clause would not bar retrial because the agent's
misconduct did not reflect the specific intent of the prosecutor or the
agent to provoke Green's motion for a mistrial.2 ' Green appealed to the
Fourth Circuit.22
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Green's mo-
tion to dismiss, finding that the agent's improper statement did not con-
stitute prosecutorial overreaching to the extent necessary to bar retrial
under the Dinitz holding.23 The salient issue in Green was whether the
agent's misconduct constituted overreaching within the Dinitz excep-
tion.24 The court, relying on the language of Dinitz, ruled that the Dinitz
holding limits exceptions to situations in which the prosecutor specifically
intends to provoke a mistrial request from the defendant and is inappli-
cable to other forms of misconduct intended to prejudice the defendant
in a more generalized manner.
25
The Fourth Circuit determined that the record supported the district
court's finding.2 The Green court held that the record did not establish
that the prosecutor had specifically intended to provoke a mistrialY The
" Id. at 926-27. Evidence of other crimes not charged in an indictment is not admissible
as part of the case against a defendant unless the evidence falls within one of the exceptions
of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). FED. R. EVID. 404(b); United States v. Johnson, 610 F.2d
194, 196 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 911 (1980). Rule 404(b) provides that evidence
of other crimes is not admissible to prove the character of a defendant in order to show that
he acted in conformity with that character. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). The evidence, however,
may be admissible as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. The prosecutor in Green did not claim that
the statement of the agent fell within one of the enumerated exceptions to Rule 404(b). 636
F.2d at 926-27.
18 636 F.2d at 927; see note 16 supra.
19 636 F.2d at 927.
2* Id.; see note 1 supra.
2 636 F.2d at 927; see text accompanying note 9 supra.
' 636 F.2d at 927. The district court order denying Green's motion to dismiss was ap-
pealable as a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). The order of denial satisfies the
collateral order exception to the rule of finality embodied in § 1291. Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977).
' 636 F.2d at 930; see text accompanying note 6 supra.
, 636 F.2d at 928.
1' Id. at 927. The Green court emphasized that it would not disturb the findings of the
lower court on the specific intent issue unless the defendant could show that the findings
were clearly erroneous. Id. at 928; see text accompanying note 60 infra.
21 636 F.2d at 928.
Id. at 928-29.
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Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that the prosecu-
tor had not in any manner anticipated or encouraged -the agent's state-
ment.2 The appellate court stated that the prosecutor's request for
curative jury instructions coupled with the subsequent conviction-.of
Green's two co-defendants negatived any inference that the prosecutor
specifically intended to cause a mistrial.' Additionally, the Fourth Cir-
cuit emphasized the district court's finding that the agent's spontaneous
outburst did not reflect a specific intent to provoke Green's mistrial mo-
tion3 The court did not discuss the determination of the trial court that
the agent did intend to make a statement that would affect the trial."
In addressing the question of whether the special agent fell within
the ambit of the term "prosecutor,"' 2 the Fourth Circuit held the Dinitz
exception inapplicable to government witnesses. The Green court em-
phasized the trial court's finding that the record did not indicate the
prosecutor in any manner had planned, anticipated, or condoned the
agent's spontaneous statement.' The court noted that the prosecutor
had a responsibility to sustain both the actual and apparent integrity of
the judicial proceeding. 5 The Fourth Circuit concluded, however, that to
hold the prosecutor responsible for the agent's misconduct on the Green
facts would constitute an unwarranted and overbroad extension of double
jeopardy protection. The Green court balanced the defendant's in-
terests in avoiding the anxiety, delay, expense, and potential prejudice
inherent in a second trial against the public's interest in the prevention,
punishment, and deterrence of crime. 7 The court stated that the defen-
Id. at 928 n.7.
Id. at 928.
Id. To support his conclusion that the prosecutor had not planned or anticipated the
statement, the district judge in Green emphasized that the agent's statement was spur of
the moment. Id. at 927. The Fourth Circuit's added characterization of the statement as a
blurting out led to the conclusion that neither the prosecutor nor the agent planned the
statement. See id. at 928. The dissent in Green pointed out that in granting a mistrial the
district judge remarked that he thought that the agent, with four and a half years ex-
perience with the Drug Enforcement Agency and five years experience with the police force'
in Washington, D.C. would know that such a statement would be impermissible. Id. at 931
(Winter, J., dissenting).
", Id. at 928.
2 Id-
3 Id.
Id.; see note 30 supra.
636 F.2d at 928.
Id. The Green court reasoned that to include the agent within the term prosecutor
would be to include every federal agent involved in a criminal matter who participates in
evidence collection or trial preparation but who is not in charge of the prosecution. Id:
Precedent supports the Fourth Circuit's distinction between the prosecuting attorney and
police or other law, enforcement officials. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 377 A.2d 411,
416 n.7 (D.C. App. 1977) (police witness not a prosecutor); People v. Pohl, 47 Il. App. 2d 232,
237, 197 N.E.2d 759, 766 (1974) (state police officer not a "proper prosecuting officer"). But
see text accompanying notes 79-81 infra.
" 636 F.2d at 928-29.
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dant's inconvenience in having to face retrial must defer to society's in-
terest in a final determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence.3
The Fourth Circuit noted that society has a further interest in punishing
a defendant whose guilt is clear after he has had a fair trial.39 The court,
therefore, implicitly held that even if it were to find that the agent
specifically intended to provoke a mistrial, the agent's misconduct would
not bar retrial under the Dinitz holding since his intentional act was not
attributable to the prosecutor himself."0
In Green, the Fourth Circuit confronted a choice between the two
standards courts employ to determine what constitutes overreaching
within the Dinitz exception.41 The First, Second, Fifth and Eighth Cir-
cuits follow a general intent to prejudice standard and hold that the dou-
ble jeopardy clause bars reprosecution after mistrial on the defendant's
motion when the conduct of the judge or prosecutor is intentional or
grossly negligent and results in serious prejudice to the defendant.42
Under the general intent to prejudice standard, any purposeful miscon-
duct by the prosecutor that results in serious prejudice will bar retrial."
I Id. The Green court underscored society's interest in a final determination of the
defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. The court did not make the traditional reference to the
fairness of that determination. Id.; see text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
" 636 F.2d at 929.
40 Id.
41 See Double Jeopardy Dilemma, supra note 6, at 986; text accompanying notes 43-56
infra. See generally A Resolution, supra note 2, at 914-18.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Zozlio, 617 F.2d 314, 315 (1st Cir. 1980) (failure of govern-
ment to comply strictly with pretrial discovery orders not overreaching when no evidence
of grossly negligent or intentional effort to harass or prejudice defendant, or provoke
mistrial); United States v. Davis, 589 F.2d 904, 906 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 950 (1979)
(no overreaching when prosecutor's conduct inadvertent and defendant did not allege he
was prejudiced); Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1979) (judicial prank not over-
reaching when not evidencing desire to prejudice or harass defendant and defendant did not
show he was prejudiced by the misconduct); United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 140 (8th
Cir. 1977) (overreaching when prosecutor's reading of irrelevant and highly prejudicial
grand jury testimony to trial jury constituted gross negligence).
' See United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 139 (8th Cir. 1977). In Martin, the defen-
dant moved for a mistrial when the prosecutor read allegedly impermissible grand jury
testimony to the trial jury. Id. at 137. The trial judge granted the motion. Id. The judge,
however, denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground of double
jeopardy since both prosecuting attorneys submitted affidavits in which they swore that
they did not intend their actions to specifically provoke a mistrial. Id. at 138. The Eighth
Circuit, reversing the conviction, stated that the reading of the testimony amounted to
gross negligence and thus constituted overreaching sufficient to bar retrial. Id. at 138-41.
One commentator has criticized the Martin decision for failing to provide guidelines specify-
ing what type of misconduct will constitute gross negligence. See Double Jeopardy Dilem-
ma, supra note 6, at 988. Moreover, since the Martin court found both that the prosecutors
intended their actions to lessen the defendant's chances for acquittal and that serious pre-
judice resulted from the misconduct, the court seems to have implicitly based its finding of
overreaching on the general intent to prejudice standard. See 561 F.2d at 135.
The Fifth Circuit also mentioned a gross negligence standard in United States v.
Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976). In Kessler, the Fifth Circuit found prosecutorial over-
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Courts reason that whether the prosecutor specifically intends to pro-
voke a mistrial, or generally intends to prejudice or lessen the defen-
dant's chances for acquittal, the net result is the same." In either case,
the prosecutor's overreaching leaves the defendant with a "Hobson's
choice.""5 The defendant must elect whether to continue with the error-
laden first trial or to move for a mistrial and face relitigation.8 If he
chooses to continue with the first trial, he will save himself the anxiety,
delay, and expense of a second trial."' He may also, however, face an in-
creased risk of conviction because of the prejudice resulting from the
prosecutor's misconduct.48 Alternatively, if the defendant rejects the
first tribunal and chooses to pursue a second trial, he will be free of any
prejudice held by the first trier of fact. Nevertheless, he again will be
subject to an increased risk of conviction, since the witnesses testifying
against him will have an opportunity to strengthen their testimony
through rehearsal and repetition.4 9
In deciding Green, the Fourth Circuit cited without discussion the
grossly negligent or intentional misconduct standard of the Fifth
Circuit." The Green court, however, functionally adopted the narrower
specific intent to provoke standard employed by the Third, Fourth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits." Under the specific intent standard, the
defendant must establish two elements on appeal in order to prove
reaching when the prosecutor, intending to prejudice the defendant, introduced known false
evidence and serious prejudice resulted. Id. at 1254-58. The Kessler court equated prosecu-
torial overreaching with gross negligence or intentional misconduct. Id. As in Martin,
however, because the prosecutor in Kessler generally intended to prejudice the defendant's
chances for acquittal and actual prejudice resulted, the Fifth Circuit also seems to have im-
plicitly based its finding of overreaching on the general intent to prejudice standard. Id.; see
561 F.2d at 139. In short, it does not appear that prosecutorial misconduct amounting only
to gross negligence has ever barred a retrial. See Mitchell v. Smith, 633 F.2d 1009, 1012 n.12
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 879 (1981).
" See Mitchell v. Smith, 633 F.2d 1009, 1012 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 879
(1981); Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Roberts, 640 F.2d
225, 229 (9th Cir. 1981) (Norris, J., dissenting) (no valid distinction between prosecutorial
misconduct intended to prejudice the defendant and prosecutorial misconduct intended to
provoke a mistrial).
" United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609. A Hobson's choice is a choice between tak-
ing what is offered or taking nothing at all. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY Dic-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED, 864 (2d ed. 1976).
" 424 U.S. at 609. See A Resolution, supra note 2, at 914-18.
' See note 1 supra.
"See note 2 supra.
See A Resolution, supra note 2, at 913.
o 636 F.2d at 927-28; see United States v. Davis, 589 F.2d 904, 906 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S 950 (1979).
"1 636 F.2d at 928. See United States v. Gamble, 607 F.2d '820 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1092 (1980); United States v. Nelson, 582 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1079 (1979); United States v. Cerilli, 558 F.2d 697 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977) United States v. Mandel, 550 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam).
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prosecutorial overreaching and gain double jeopardy protection.52 First,
the defendant must show that the prosecutor possessed a specific sub-
jective intent to provoke a mistrial motion.' Second, the defendant must
show that the trial court's finding of no bad faith or overreaching was
clearly erroneous. 4 Courts employing the specific intent standard
acknowledge the defendant's difficulty of proof but justify the standard
by pointing to society's interest in the prevention, punishment, and
deterrence of crime.
55
The soundness of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Green depends
upon the propriety of limiting the double jeopardy protection of the
Dinitz holding to situations in which the prosecutor deliberately at-
tempts to provoke a mistrial. Prior case law and the policies underlying
the double jeopardy clause bear upon the propriety of such a limitation.
The Green court's decision is consistent with previous Fourth Circuit
cases that have endorsed the specific intent standard.57 Additionally,
although the Supreme Court repeatedly has refused to establish a per se
rule governing mistrials,58 the specific intent standard is consonant with
recent Supreme Court decisions favoring the interests of society over
those of the defendant in the double jeopardy context. 9 Finally, the
Fourth Circuit's application of the clearly erroneous standard to the trial
52 636 F.2d at 928.
5 Id.; see Heitz, supra note 7, at 490.
636 F.2d at 928. A finding cannot be clearly erroneous if there is substantial
evidence to support the finding, notwithstanding the existence of substantial conflicting
evidence. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949).
5 See 636 F.2d at 928-29; note 51 supra.
See notes 2 & 3 supra; notes 61-64 infra.
5' See, e.g., United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1972) (pre-Dinitz). In
Lansdown, the trial judge granted a mistrial motion over the defendant's objection. Id. at
171. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted with approval the pre-Dinitz rule that when a
court declares a mistrial at the request of the defendant, the court generally deems the
defendant to have waived any claim of double jeopardy protection. Id. at 171 n.8. The
Fourth Circuit modified or sub silentio overruled Lansdown in United States v. Mandel, 550
F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (no bar.to retrial when mistrial granted absent bad
faith provocation by court or prosecutor (citing Lansdown)).
I See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 (1963) (each case must turn on its
facts); accord, United States v. Moon, 491 F.2d 1047, 1049 (5th Cir. 1974); Russo v. Superior
Court, 483 F.2d 7, 13 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973); McNeal v. Hollowell, 481
F.2d 1145, 1149 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
" See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 470-71 (1973) (courts should be less will-
ing to accord defendant's interest great weight if societal interests indicate desirability of
retrial). See generally Double Jeopardy Dilemma, supra note Q, at 987-88. In the 1960's the
Supreme Court declared that a trial judge should resolve any doubt concerning the allow-
ance of a mistrial in favor of the defendant. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. at 738.
But see United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (high cost to society if every accused
granted immunity from punishment on account of any defect constituting reversible error).
Recently, the Supreme Court has indicated its concern that too many criminal defendants
exit the judicial process without a binding determination of guilt or innocence. See 410 U.S.
at 470-71.
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court's determination that the prosecutor did not act in bad faith is con-
sistent with the position of several circuits that defer to the judgment of
trial courts concerning prosecutorial or judicial bad faith."
The Dinitz holding does not, however, compel an appellate court to
adopt the specific intent standard." The language in Dinitz supports
both the specific and general intent to prejudice standards . 2 By its
terms, the Dinitz holding supports a bar to retrial whenever deliberate
prosecutorial misconduct results in a defense motion for mistrial and
prejudices the defendant's chances for acquittal. 3 Courts, therefore, can
interpret dicta in subsequent Supreme Court cases as supporting both
standards."
Since there are difficulties inherent in proving specific intent, the
defendant will rarely, if ever, enjoy double jeopardy protection under
the specific intent standad. 5 As a result, the specific intent standard
clearly protects the public's interest in the prosecution, punishment, and
deterrence of crime.6 In addition, the specific intent standard promotes
judicial economy because a defendant, knowing tnat he would most likely
not be able to prove specific intent, would elect to continue with the
error-laden first trial. 7
The specific intent standard, however, disserves society's interest in
" See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516-17 (1978); United States v. Gamble, 607
F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1092 (1980); United States v. Davis, 589
F.2d 904, 906 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950 (1979); United States v. Wilson, 534 F.2d
76, 81-82 (6th Cr. 1976). See generally The Reprosecution Problem, supra note 1, at 1277-78.
The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that when governmental misconduct evidences
oppression of the defendant, deference to the trial judge's ruling is not appropriate and dou-
ble jeopardy protection will bar retrial following such misconduct. See Lee v. United States,
432 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1977). See generally Double Jeopardy Dilemma, supra note 6, at 987-88.
61 See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611. The Dinitz Court stated that the double
jeopardy clause protects a defendant against governmental actions by which the judge or
prosecutor intend to provoke a defense request for a mistrial. Id. In contrast, the Court fur-
ther stated that double jeopardy bars retrial when bad faith conduct by the judge or prose-
cutor threatens to harass an accused, thereby affording the prosecution a more favorable
opportunity to convict. Id.
62 Id
3 Id
" See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 29 (1977). The Lee Court cited the holding in
Dinitz, supra note 61, for the proposition that in order to bar retrial, the defense request for
a mistrial must have been the result of a general attempt by the judge or prosecutor to
harass or prejudice the defendant. Id. In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980),
however, the Court cited the Dinitz holding, supra note 61, for the proposition that
reprosecution is not barred following the granting of a defense mistrial request unless the
prosecutor specifically intended to provoke the request. 449 U.S. at 124-25.
ISee AM. CRIM., supra note 3, at 188. To date, only one court employing the specific
intent to provoke standard has found a sufficient degree of prosecutorial overreaching to
bar reprosecution. See Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d 177 (1967) (specific
intent when prosecutor openly acknowledged that he deliberately caused mistrial).
See note 3 supra.
67 See generally A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE
DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 421 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as TRIAL MANUAL].
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a fair and final determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence since
the standard encourages a finaf verdict at all costs. 8 Moreover, strictly
limiting the defendant's double jeopardy protection to cases in which he
can prove specific intent results in a hollow guarantee of constitutional
rights to the defendant whenever the prosecutor intends generally to
prejudice the defendant's chances for acquittal and actual prejudice
results.
6 9
The policy underlying the double jeopardy clause supports uniform
adoption of the general intent or deliberate misconduct standard." The
general intent or deliberate misconduct standard places a heavy burden
on a defendant to prove prosecutorial overreaching' The defendant
must first show that the prosecutor generally intended to lessen his
chance of acquittal or that the prosecutor's conduct was grossly
negligent.72 Second, the defendant must show that the prosecutor's
misconduct actually prejudiced him.73 Because of the heavy burden that
the standard imposes upon the defendant, the standard will preserve
society's interest in a fair and final determination of the defendant's
guilt or innocence. 4 At the same time, the general intent standard will
protect a defendant by shielding him from prejudice resulting from
deliberate prosecutorial misconduct.75 The standard thus encourages
competence by judges and prosecutors, while affording the defendant
his double jeopardy protection.7 6 The party responsible for the deliber-
ate misconduct or grossly negligent mistake will bear responsibility for
the misconduct or mistake.77
The Green court correctly concluded that a prosecutor should not be
liable for the independent misconduct of a government witness.78 To bar
reprosecution because of errors that the prosecution has not incited and
truly cannot control would make courts reluctant to grant defense
mistrial motions. 9 Although this reluctance to grant mistrials arguably
See text accompanying notes 2 & 3 supra.
69 AM. CRIM., supra note 3, at 188.
o See United States v. Green, 101 S. Ct. 2005 (1981). Mr. Justice Marshall dissented to
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Green. Id. at 2005-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall argued that the court should resolve the confusion by employing the
general intent to prejudice standard. Id.
"' See Heitz, supra note 6, at 489.
72 Id.
73 Id.
" See note 3 supra.
71 See notes 43-49 supra.
' Double Jeopardy Dilemma, supra note 6, at 986.
Id. Prosecutorial accountability is consistent with the general rule of negligence that
usually holds the grossly negligent actor accountable to the victim. Id.
71 See note 36 supra.
7 See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra. Courts would be understandably reluctant
to grant defense mistrial motions when the motion results from errors that the prosecutor
cannot control. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466. The courts' granting of such mo-
tions would implicitly impose upon the prosecutor a duty to guarantee every defendant a
trial free from error. Id
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would protect society's interest in a final determination of guilt or in-
nocence," it would disserve the public's and the defendant's interest in a
fair determination." On the other hand, failure to bar reprosecution
following the intentional error of a key government witness who to the
jury may appear to be the alter-ego of the prosecutor frustrates both
the defendant's and society's interests in a fair andfinal determination
of guilt or innocence.12 When the witness plays a central if not determin-
ative role in the prosecution, and when serious prejudice results from
the witness' intentional error, it is appropriate to hold the prosecutor ac-
countable for his failure to prevent the witness' deliberate misconduct.
3
Such accountability seems particularly appropriate on the facts before
the Green court since the special agent played a central role and possessed
sufficient experience to know that his conduct was improper and that it
could seriously prejudice the defendant." The Fourth Circuit's conspicu-
ous failure to establish guidelines for determining when a special agent
attains prosecutor status or when a prosecutor may be grossly negligent
thus provides little guidance to courts, prosecutors, or defendants who
are considering a mistrial motion.
In Green, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the double jeopardy
clause does not bar retrial of a criminal defendant in all situations. 5 The
Green court, however, narrowly construed the Dinitz overreaching ex-
ception to find that governmental misconduct generally intended to pre-
judice a defendant's chances for acquittal will not bar retrial of a defen-
dant.8 Since the jury convicted Green's co-defendants forthe same of-
fense with which the government charged Green, the denial of Green's
motion to dismiss may have been correct. 7 Moreover, although the
special agent seems to have generally intended to prejudice Green's
chances for acquittal, the Fourth Circuit did not address whether the
agent's misconduct actually prejudiced the defendant.8 Consequently, it
See note 3 supra.
81 See note 2 supra.
See United States v. Green, 101 S. Ct. 2005, 2007 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In
his dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari in Green, Mr. Justice Marshall stated that
nothing in the Dinitz decision suggests that the Court meant to limit its holding solely to the
misconduct of the prosecutor himself. Id Judge Winter, dissenting in Green, argued that
the Dinitz term "prosecutorial error" is not limited literally to the prosecutor. 636 F.2d at
931 (Winter, J., dissenting). Winter argued that this is especially true in a situation such as
that before the court in Green, where the prosecutor's witness, though perhaps not
specifically intending to provoke a mistrial, clearly was trying to prejudice the jury with an
improper, vindictive remark. Id. The dissent contended that the Fourth Circuit should have
classified the agent as a prosecutor because of the agent's extensive involvement in the
preparation and trial of the case. Id. The dissent noted that the agent had a detailed
knowledge of the case and that he sat at counsel table during the trial. Id.
See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
See note 72 supra.
See text accompanying notes 24-31 supra.
8 See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
7 See 636 F.2d at 928-29.
8 Id. at 929; see note 82 supra.
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is, possible that the agent's misconduct would not satisfy even the
general intent standard. 9 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, based its refusal
to bar retrial on broad policy considerations rather than on an analysis
of the facts of the particular case." The Green court appears to have
been preoccupied with the possibility that district courts within the
Fourth Circuit would grant virtually automatic immunity to defendants
if the courts employed any test other than the specific intent to provoke
standard.91
The Green decision will have several substantive and procedural
ramifications within the Fourth Circuit. First, courts employing the nar-
row specific intent standard rarely will find that the prosecutor
specifically intended to provoke a mistrial because there will be insuffi-
cient evidence that the prosecutor did not merely intend to prejudice the
jury in the hope of winning a guilty verdict.92 As a result, defense
counsel within the Fourth Circuit must be acutely aware of all strategic
considerations when moving for a mistrial. Counsel must prepare the
defendant to choose between requesting a second trial and continuing
with the error-laden first trial.9 3 Such preparation will include informing
the defendant of the increased risk of conviction inherent in either
course of action.94 Second, defendants in the Fourth Circuit will remain
uncertain as to whether grossly negligent or intentional misconduct of
the prosecutor resulting in the defendant's motion for mistrial will ever
bar reprosecution.95 Third, defendants will be uncertain of their rights
when governmental misconduct reflects a specific intent to provoke a
mistrial but is not the conduct of the prosecutor himself.9" Finally, prose-
cuting attorneys in the Fourth Circuit will enjoy diminished accountabil-
ity concerning what they offer into evidence, the manner in which they
present the evidence, and the manner in which their witnesses offer
testimony.97
" See text accompanying notes 42-49, 71-73 supra.
" See 636 F.2d at 929 n.9. The Fourth Circuit, relying on United States v. Tateo, 377
U.S. at 466, warned that if the Green court allowed Green double jeopardy protection, the
entire class of criminal defendants would suffer because courts would be reluctant to grant
mistrial motions if they knew that reprosecution would almost certainly be barred under a
more liberal standard. Id. The court thus implicitly imposed a per se rule upon Green, vir-
tually refusing to review the merits of his case. See note 58 supra. Under the Green court's
per se standard, the question of which party moves for the mistrial will usually be deter-
minative. See Comment, Retrial After Mistria. The Double Jeopardy Doctrine of Manifest
Necessity, 45 Miss. L.J. 1272, 1278 (1974); text accompanying notes 4 & 5, 55 supra.
" See 636 F.2d at 929 n.10.
See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
9 See TRIAL MANUAL, supra note 68, § 421. Defense counsel in the Fourth Circuit
should consider relying on the trial judge to declare a mistrial sua sponte, thus almost
automatically precluding reprosecution. See AM. CRIM., supra note 3, at 169.
" See text accompanying notes 43-49 supra.
" See text accompanying note 50 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 78-84 supra.
" See note 17 supra.
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In short, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Green will discourage
defense mistrial motions and compel defendants to continue, at their
peril, with even a seriously tainted trial. In the Fourth Circuit, prosecu-
torial mistake or misconduct resulting in a defendant's successful motion
for mistrial will afford the defendant double jeopardy protection only if
the defendant can prove that the prosecutor specifically intended to pro-
voke the mistrial.
WILLIAM D. JOHNSTON
C. General Verdicts and Multiple-Objective Conspiracy Counts:
Complications on Review
Conspiracy is an inchoate crime.' A conspiracy is an agreement be-
tween two or more persons to commit a crime.' To obtain a conviction
under the general federal conspiracy statute,' the prosecution must
show, first, an agreement to commit a crime and, .second, that a con-
spirator committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the illegal ob-
jective within the applicable time period preceding the indictment." The
United States v. Bell, 577 F.2d 1313, 1315 (5th Cir. 1978).
United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 1978). The conspirators need
not have a formal agreement to commit an offense; a tacit understanding is sufficient to
create a conspiracy. United States v. McCarty, 611 F.2d 220, 222 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980). A mere meeting of the minds of the conspirators can satisfy the
agreement requirement. United States v. Lopez, 576 F.2d 840, 844 (10th Cir. 1978).
3 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). The general federal conspiracy statute provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or
for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both....
Id.
' United States v. Bankston, 603 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1979) (essential elements of
conspiracy are agreement to commit crime plus overt act in furtherance of agreement);
United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 1978) (conspiracy is agreement to
commit unlawful act and is complete when one conspirator commits act in furtherance of ob-
jective); Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97, 104 (6th Cir. 1956) (conspiracy complete on
formation of criminal agreement and performance of overt act in furtherance thereof), cert.-
denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957). Furthermore, the overt act need not be a crime itself. 237 F.2d
at 105 (citing Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942)); see United States v. Scallion,
533 F.2d 903, 911 (5th Cir. 1976) (when Government charged conspiracy to obtain money
fraudulently from casinos in Las Vegas, travelling to Las Vegas sufficient overt act), cert.
denied sub nom. Jenkins v. United States, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977).
To support a conviction under the conspiracy statute the prosecutor must show that a
conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy within the applicable
time period preceding the indictment. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97
(1957) (when conspiracy indictment returned October 24, 1954, and applicable statute of
limitations three years, Government must prove conspirator committed overt act after Oc-
tober 24, 1951). See also United States v. Davis, 533 F.2d 921, 926 (5th Cir. 1976) (when con-
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prosecution need not prove that a defendant actually committed the
substantive crime he conspired to commit.5
A single conspiracy count may charge a conspiracy to violate plural
substantive offenses.' A single agreement to violate multiple substan-
tive offenses is only a single violation of the conspiracy statute.7 A jury
may convict under a multiple-objective conspiracy count if the evidence
spiracy indictment returned September 5, 1974, and applicable statute of limitations five
years, Government must present evidence that conspirator committed overt act on or after
September 5, 1969 or conspiracy count does not go to jury); United States v. Brasco, 516
F.2d 816, 818 (2d Cir.) (to avoid time bar, Government required to show one overt act occur-
red within applicable time period), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 860 (1975); United States v. Nowak,
448 F.2d 134, 139 (7th Cir. 1971) (conviction for conspiracy requires proof that conspirator
performed overt act within applicable time period), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972).
The general federal conspiracy statute contains no specific statute of limitations. See
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976); note 3 supra. Section 3282 of Title 18 of the United States Code,
however, provides a general five year statute of limitations applicable to any non-capital
criminal offense unless the offense charged contains a specific statute of limitations. See 18
U.S.C. § 3282 (1976). When an indictment charges a defendant with conspiracy to violate a
substantive offense that provides a specific limitation period, that limitation period also ap-
plies to the conspiracy count. United States v. Lowder, 492 F.2d 953, 956 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1092 (1974). In Lowder, the Government charged the defendant with con-
spiring to commit tax evasion. 492 F.2d at 954. The Fourth Circuit held that the applicable
limitations period was six years instead of five. Id. at 956. The court reasoned that tax of-
fenses carry a specific statute of limitations in section 6531 of Title 26 of the United States
Code. Id. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6531(3) & (8) (1976). Therefore, the general statute of limitations
contained in section 3282 of Title 18 is inapplicable by its terms. 492 F.2d at 956. See 18
U.S.C. § 3282 (1976).
5 See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975). The prosecution does not have
to prove commission of the substantive crime that was the object of the conspiracy because
conspiracy is a crime separate from the substantive offense. See Braverman v. United
States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 (1942); Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97, 103-04 (6th Cir. 1956).
For example, in Poliafico v. United States the Government prosecuted 14 defendants for
conspiracy to violate narcotics laws. Id. at 101-02. Some of the defendants participated in
the actual sale of narcotics. See id. Assuming a conspirator committed an overt act, the
defendants who sold narcotics are criminally liable for both conspiracy to sell narcotics and
the substantive crime of selling narcotics. See id. at 116. The defendants who did not par-
ticipate in the actual sale are criminally liable only for conspiracy. See id. at 103-04.
6 See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 (1942) (single agreement, however
diverse its objects, is prohibited conspiracy and violates but single statute); Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919) (conspiracy is one crime, however diverse its objects).
' Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 (1942); Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204, 210 (1919); see note 6 supra. Braverman illustrates that a single agreement to
violate multiple substantive offenses is but a single conspiracy. See 317 U.S. at 53-55. In
Braverman, the Government charged the defendant with conspiracy to carry on an illegal li-
quor business, to possess liquor bottles without the proper tax stamp, to transport such
liquor, to carry on a liquor business without the required bond, to hide liquor bottles with
intent to defraud the United States of taxes on such liquor, to process an unregistered
distilling apparatus, and to make on unauthorized premises mash fit for distillation. Id. at 50
n.1. Each of the seven objects violated a separate and distinct statute. Id. at 50. The Court
held that a single agreement to violate any number of criminal statutes is but a single viola-
tion of the conspiracy statute. Id. at 54.
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convinces the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed
regarding any one of the objectives charged.'
A jury in a criminal trial usually returns a general verdict of guilty
or not guilty.' A general verdict does not reveal the specific grounds
upon which it rests.10 Therefore, when a jury convicts a defendant on a
multiple-objective conspiracy count, a reviewing court cannot know
which substantive crime(s) the jury found he conspired to commit."
Similarly, when the prosecution alleges several overt acts in furtherance
of the conspiracy, the reviewing court cannot know upon which overt
act(s) the jury's verdict rests."2
If every alleged objective offense in a multiple-objective conspiracy
' See United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1980) (when indictment
charges conspiracy to violate two statutes, jury may convict on finding defendant conspired
to violate either statute); United States v. Wilkinson, 601 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1979)
(same); United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 391 (9th Cir.) (jury required only to find
that conspiracy existed regarding one of the unlawful objects in order to convict on a
double-objective conspiracy count), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976).
1 2 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 512 (1969 & Supp. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. Before 1972, the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure had no provision permitting a special verdict. See id. In 1972, however, a rule pro-
viding for special verdicts in criminal forfeiture cases was added to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e). Special verdicts are appropriate in criminal
forfeiture cases because the amount of the interest or property subject to forfeiture is an
element of the offense that the Government must prove. Notes of Advisory Committee on
Rules, FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e). The propriety of special verdicts in other criminal cases is
questionable. See United States v. James, 432 F.2d 303, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1970) (use of special
verdict error in multiple-objective conspiracy trial), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 906 (1971); United
States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 183 (1st Cir. 1969) ("special findings" in verdict of conspiracy
to counsel, aid, and abet registrants to resist draft held prejudicial error because issue
whether defendants exceeded bounds of free speech was for jury discretion to apply com-
munity standard or conscience); Gray v. United States, 174 F.2d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir.) (use of
special verdict in any criminal case error), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 848 (1949). But see United
States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir.) (judge had power to use special verdict at
jury's request in multiple-objective conspiracy trial), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly permit the use of special verdicts.
FED. R. Civ. P. 49. Courts are reluctant, however, to allow use of special verdicts in criminal
trials for at least two reasons. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 512. First, the criminal jury's
duty does not stop at factfinding. Id. Rather, the jury's duty includes application of the law
to the facts pursuant to the judge's instructions'. Id. Second, courts see the special verdict in
criminal cases as judicial encroachment upon the jury's function. See United States v.
Spock, 416 F.2d at 181. The Spock court argued that a court should allow the jury to act as
the conscience of the community by permitting the jury to look at more than mere logic. Id.
at 182. Since interrogatories tie the jury to bare logic, special verdicts encroach on the
jury's function. Id. at 181-82. Furthermore, an historic function of the jury is to temper rules
of law with common sense. Id. Special verdicts can encroach upon the jury's function by
discouraging the jury from tempering rules of law with its own sense of fairness. Id.
"I See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1957); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 367-68 (1931).
" See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. at 311-12; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. at
367-68; text accompanying note 10 supra.
, See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. at 311-12; text accompanying note 10 supra.
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count properly defines a crime, then it is immaterial which substantive
crime the jury found that the defendant conspired to commit. 3 If, how-
ever, one of the objective offenses failed for any reason to state a crime,
then the reviewing court cannot know from a general verdict that the
jury did not convict the defendant upon an invalid ground. 4 Similarly, if
every alleged overt act in furtherance of the multiple-objective con-
spiracy properly may form the basis of a conviction, then it is immaterial
upon which overt act(s) thejury rested its verdict. 15 If, however, the trial
court wrongly submitted to the jury one or more alleged overt acts, then
the reviewing court cannot know from a general verdict that the jury
did not rely upon a wrongfully submitted act to convict."6
In United States v. Head7 the Fourth Circuit addressed the problem
created when a general guilty verdict under a multiple-objective conspir-
acy count follows the trial court's wrongful submission of several alleged
overt acts to the jury. 8 A federal grand jury handed down an indictment
against Murdock Head, count one of which charged him with conspiring
to bribe a congressman, conspiring to give a thing of value to an Internal
Revenue Service agent, and conspiring to evade federal income taxes. 9
II See text accompanying notes 8 & 11 supra.
See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. at 368. If a reviewing court declares one of the
objective substantive offenses unconstitutional, the court cannot know that the jury did not
convict the defendant solely for his participation in activities constitutionally immune from
prosecution. See id.
IS See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. at 311-12.
"' See id.; text accompanying note 14 supra.
7 641 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981).
"s See id. at 177, 179. In Head, the relevant statute of limitations barred several of the
alleged overt acts that the trial court submitted to the jury from forming the basis for a con-
spiracy conviction. Id. at 177; see text accompanying note 4 supra & text accompanying
notes 20-21 infra.
Statutes of limitations for criminal statutes serve several purposes. See Note, The
Statute-of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L.
REv. 630, 632-35 (1954). A defendant faces an unfair burden in defending himself against
charges of long past conduct. Id. at 632. As time passes, defense witnesses may die or move
away. Id. Memories fade and records are lost. Id. Furthermore, criminal prosecutions should
be based on the most trustworthy evidence. Id. As time passes witnesses' memories fade,
making their testimony less trustworthy. Id.
"' 641 F.2d at 176. Count one of the indictment, the conspiracy count, charged Head
with conspiring to bribe Congressman Daniel Flood and his aide in violation of sections
201(b) and f) of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b) & (f) (1976); conspiring
to give a thing of value to an Internal Revenue Service agent who was performing an audit
on Head's corporation in violation of section 201(f) of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18
U.S.C. § 201(f) (1976); and conspiring to evade his corporation's federal income taxes in viola-
tion of sections 7201 and 7206 of Title 26 of the United States Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 &
7206 (1976). 641 F.2d at 176. The grand jury indicted Head on twelve other counts. Id. Count
two alleged that Head paid a $1000 bribe to Congressman Flood. Id. The trial court dismiss-
ed count two on the Government's motion. Id. Counts three through seven charged Head
with giving a thing of value, an $11,000 low interest loan and forbearance in collecting
amounts due, to an Internal Revenue Service agent who was performing an audit on Head's
corporation. Id. The district court dismissed counts three through seven after the Govern-
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The Government alleged twenty overt acts in furtherance- of the con-
spiracy.0 Only five of the alleged acts, however, had occurred within the
five year statute of limitations period.2 The jury returned a general guil-
ty verdict against Head on the conspiracy count.' Head challenged the
conviction arguing that the trial court's jury instructions on the con-
spiracy count were fatally defective because the instructions failed* to
address the statute of limitations issue relevant to the bribery and "giv-
ing a thing of value" objects of the conspiracy." The Government argued
in response that Head failed to request a proper instruction.2 4 The
Government argued further that even if the trial court erred by failing
to give a statute of limitations instruction, the possibility of prejudice to
Head was too speculative to warrant reversal.
2 5
The Fourth Circuit rejected as meritless the Government's failure to
request argument." The Head court also rejected the Government's
speculative prejudice argument and reversed Head's conviction.7 The
court refused to speculate that the jury found the conspiracy related to
the tax object28 or that the verdict rested upon an overt act committed
within the limitations period.' Instead, the Fourth Circuit held that a
ment presented its case. Id. at 176-77. The district court found either no evidence of
forebearance or that forebearance was not a thing of value within the meaning of section
201(f) of Title 18 of the United States Code. 641 F.2d at 177. Counts eight through thirteen
charged read with evading his corporation's taxes. Id. The trial court dismissed four of
those counts because of insufficient evidence. Id. The jury acquitted Head on the'remaining
two counts. Id. Head, therefore, stood convicted only of conspiracy. See id. at 176-77.
Id. at 177.
21 Id.; see text accompanying note 4 supra.
641 F.2d at 177. The generally guilty verdict against Head did not reveal upon which
overt act(s) the jury based its verdict. See id.; see text acompanying notes 9-12 supra.
" 641 F.2d at 177. Head argued that the trial judge should have instructed the jury
that the Government must prove that a conspirator committed an overt act within the
limitations period in furtherance of the bribery and "giving a thing of value" objects of the
conspiracy. Id.; see note 19 supra. Head did not contend, however, that a similar instruction
was necessary for the tax evasion object of the conspiracy. 641 F.2d at 177 n.1. The statute
of limitations for the bribery and giving a thing of value objects of the conspiracy is five
years. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976); note 4 supra. The statute of limitations for the tax ob-
ject, however, is six years. 641 F.2d at 177 n.1; see 26 U.S.C. §§ 6531(3) & (8) (1976); note 4
supra.
" 641 F.2d at 177.
2Id.
" Id. The Head court noted that defense counsel twice requested the judge to instruct
the jury that to convict under the conspiracy count the jury must find that a conspirator
committed an over act within the five-year statute of limitations period. Id. Defense counsel
then asked a third time for the instruction after the jury returned a partial verdict acquit-
ting Head on the tax charges. Id. On all three occasions the district court judge denied
defense counsel's request. Id.
Id. at 178-79.
"Id. at 177-78; see text accompanying note 23 supra. The Fourth Circuit noted that
the jury acquitted Head on the substantive tax counts. 641 F.2d at 178 n.6. Therefore, the
likelihood that the jury found that the conspiracy related to the tax object was remote. Id.
" Id. at 178.
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reviewing court must reverse a-general guilty verdict upon a conspiracy
count when the court cannot determine that the verdict does not rest
upon a wrongfully submitted alleged overt act."
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Supreme Court precedent compel-
led reversal of Head's conviction.3 1 The Head court relied on Stromberg
v. California,2 in which the Supreme Court held that an appellate court
must reverse a general guilty verdict when the court cannot determine
whether the verdict rests upon an erroneous or valid view of the law.'
The Fourth Circuit also noted Yates v. United States,4 in which the
Supreme Court held that a reviewing court must reverse a general guilty
verdict when the verdict is supportable on one ground but not on
another, and the court cannot determine which ground the jury selected."
3 Id. at 178-79.
3, See id. at 179.
2 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
3 641 F.2d at 179; see 283 U.S. at 367-68 (1931). In Stromberg, California tried the
defendant under a state statute proscribing.the display of a red flag as a sign, symbol, or
emblem of opposition to organized government or as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic
action or as an aid to seditious propaganda. Id. at 361. The California statute involved in
Stromberg prohibited the display of a red flag only if a person displayed the flag for the
purposes set out in the statute. See id. at 361. The statute's prohibited purposes are set out
in the disjunctive. See id. at 363. The California trial court stated, therefore, that the jury
could convict if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant displayed the red flag
for any one or more of the three purposes that the statute mentions. Id. at 363-64.
Stromberg did not object to the trial court's interpretation of the statute. Id. at 364-65. The
trial judge instructed the jury that it could convict on a finding that Stromberg displayed
the flag for any one or more of the purposes that the statute enumerated. Id. at 363-64. The
jury convicted Stromberg by general verdict. Id. at 367-68. On review, the Supreme Court
declared that while California could proscribe the display of a red flag for the latter two pur-
poses, the state constitutionally could not proscribe the display of a red flag as a sign, sym-
bol, or emblem of opposition to organized government. Id. at 369; see generally Note, Con-
stitutional Law-Sedition Statutes-Display of Flags and Emblems of Opposition to
Organized Government, 5 S. CAL. L. REV. 172 (1931). The Court then reversed the convic-
tion, reasoning that because the verdict was general a reviewing court cannot determine
that the jury did not convict Stromberg under the unconstitutional clause. 283 U.S. at 368,
370.
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
641 F.2d at 179; see 354 U.S. at 311-12. In Yates, the jury convicted the defendant on
a single count indictment of conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the government and
conspiring to organize, as the Communist Party, a society to so advocate. Id. at 300. On
review, the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations barred prosecution for the
organizing objective of the conspiracy. Id. at 304. The Supreme Court construed "organize"
to mean the discrete act of founding an organization. Id. at 310-11. The Court rejected the
Government's argument that "organize" means the continuing process whereby an
organization sustains its membership. Id. at 304. Under the Court's interpretation of
organize, the Communist Party had been organized well outside the applicable limitations
period. Id. at 312. The Court then reversed the conspiracy conviction reasoning that it could
not determine whether the overt act the jury found was one in furtherance of the "advo-
cacy" or "organizing" function. Id. at 311-12.
In Yates, the Government argued that the trial court had instructed the jury that in
order to convict the defendant the jury must find a conspiracy involving both objectives. Id.
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Several circuits have considered the question whether an appellate
court must reverse a conviction when the court cannot determine whether
a guilty verdict rests upon an impermissible ground. 6 While noting that
not all of the federal circuit courts have applied the Stromberg-Yates ra-
tionale to reverse conspiracy convictions, the Fourth Circuit did,
however, find support for its decision among the circuits. 7 The Head
decision conflicts with decisions from the Second Circuit38 and conforms
with decisions from the Third and Ninth Circuits. 9 The decisions from
the Seventh Circuit are inconsistent.4" The Fourth Circuit found the
views of the Third and Ninth Circuits most persuasive.4
The Third Circuit has applied the Stromberg-Yates rationale strict-
ly.42 In United States v. Tarnopol,"s the Third Circuit reversed a con-
spiracy conviction after the jury had convicted Tarnopol on a triple-
objective conspiracy count 4' The general verdict followed the "one is
enough" instruction.45 The Third Circuit found that although the Govern-
ment presented evidence from which a jury could have convicted for two
of the objectives, the evidence with respect to the third objective was
legally insufficient to support a conviction."6 The Tarnopol court reversed
the conspiracy conviction because the court could not determine whether
at 311. The Court held, however, that the instructions were too ambiguous to warrant the
inference that the jury understood that it must find a conspiracy involving both objectives
in order to convict. Id. If the trial judge had instructed the jury that it must find a con-
spiracy involving both objectives, the conviction presumably could stand because the
reviewing court would have been able to determine that the multiple-objective conspiracy
conviction rested on a proper ground.
, See text accompanying notes 42-75 infra.
See 641 F.2d at 178-79.
See text accompanying notes 55-62 infra.
See text accompanying notes 42-54 infra.
,0 See text accompanying notes 63-75 infra.
41 641 F.2d at 178-79.
See text accompanying notes 43-47 infra.
'3 561 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 475-76. The jury convicted Tarnopol for conspiring to defraud the United
States in violation of section 371 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1976); conspiring to use the mails to commit fraud in violation of section 1341 of Title 18 of
the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976); and conspiring to commit a fraud in viola-
tion of section 1343 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). 561 F.2d at
467.
's 561 F.2d at 473-74. The "one is enough" instruction informs the jury that it may con-
vict under a multiple-objective conspiracy count if the evidence convinces the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed to violate any one of the objective offenses. See
text accompanying note 8 supra.
" 561 F.2d at 473-76. The Third Circuit found that the charge of conspiracy to defraud
the United States by impeding the functions of the Internal Revenue Service rested solely
on a failure to record certain sales in a sales journal and an accounts receivable ledger. Id. at
474. The court held that as a matter of law the failure to record was not enough to con-
stitute a conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding the functions of the Internal
Revenue Service. Id.
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the jury based its verdict upon a finding that the defendant conspired to
commit the third objective alone.
47
The Head court relied heavily upon the Ninth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Carman48 to support its conclusion that the reasoning of
Stromberg and Yates compelled reversal of Head's conspiracy convic-
tion.49 In Carman, the jury returned a general guilty verdict after the
"one is enough" instruction on a triple-objective conspiracy count." The
jury also convicted Carman on all three substantive objective counts.5 '
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit overturned one of the substantive offense
convictions because Carman's conduct did not fall within the statute's
proscription.2 The Carman court then reversed the conspiracy convic-
tion. 3 The court reasoned that the jury may have convicted Carman only
on finding he conspired to commit the substantive offense that the Ninth
Circuit later overturned.1
4
The Head decision conflicts with the reasoning and results of two
Second Circuit decisions.55 In United States v. Papadakis,56 the jury had
convicted Papadakis' co-defendant on a triple-objective conspiracy
count. On appeal, the Second Circuit assumed, without deciding, that
the Government's evidence with respect to one objective was legally in-
sufficient to support a conviction. The Papadakis court, however,
" Id. at 475. Accord, United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 51 (3d Cir. 1976) (convic-
tion by general verdict on single conspiracy count submitted to jury on alternative theories,
only one of which legally sufficient to justify conviction, must be reversed because convic-
tion may have rested solely upon impermissible ground), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
48 577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1978).
" See 641 F.2d at 179.
See 577 F.2d at 558, 566. The Government charged Carman with conspiring to com-
mit bribery in violation of section 201(b) of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. §
201(b) (1976); conspiring to transport money taken by fraud over a state line in violation of
section 2314 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976); and conspiring to
commit securities fraud in violation of sections 77q(a) and 77x of Title 15 of the United
States Code, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a) & 77x (1976). 577 F.2d at 558.
5, 577 F.2d at 558.
52 Id. at 564-65. The Ninth Circuit overturned Carman's conviction for transporting
money taken by fraud. Id. at 565. The court stated that while Carman placed money beyond
the reach of his creditors, Carman's action did not violate section 2314 of Title 18 of the
United States Code. Id.
577 F.2d at 566-68.
Id. at 566.
See text accompanying notes 56-62 infra.
510 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975).
510 F.2d at 289-90. The jury convicted Novoa of conspiring to obstruct justice in
violation of section 371 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976); conspir-
ing to commit narcotics offenses in violation of sections 173 and 174 of Title 21 of the United
States Code, 21 U.S.C. §§ 173 & 174 (repealed 1970), and section 3 of Title 18 of the United
States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1976); and conspiracy to obstruct communication of information
to a federal investigator in violation of section 1510 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18
U.S.C. § 1510 (1976). 510 F.2d at 289-90.
I See 510 F.2d at 297. The Second Circuit assumed that the Government's evidence
with respect to the obstruction of communication objective of the conspiracy was legally in-
sufficient to support a conviction. See id.
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upheld the conspiracy conviction reasoning that when a conspiracy has
multiple objectives, a court should uphold a conviction so long as the
evidence is sufficient to show that the defendant conspired to commit at
least one of the objectives. 9 The Papadakis court failed to address the
fact that a general verdict leaves the reviewing court uncertain which
offense in a multiple-objective conspiracy the jury found that the defen-
dant conspired to commit." The Second Circuit reached the same result
in United States v. Dixon." The Dixon court reasoned that because the
jury had convicted Dixon on a substantive offense validly charged in the
conspiracy count, no basis existed on which to question the guilty ver-
dict on the conspiracy count."2
The decisions from the Seventh Circuit regarding the problem created
by general guilty verdicts are inconsistent.' In United States v.
Tanner," the jury had convicted Tanner's two co-defendants on a
multiple-objective conspiracy count.6 The general verdict again followed
the "one is enough" instruction.9 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held
that one of the objectives of the conspiracy failed to state a federal
crime.6 The Tanner court, however, upheld the conspiracy conviction
reasoning that a reviewing court should uphold a multiple-objective con-
spiracy conviction so long as any one of the alleged, objectives is unchal-
lenged. 8 In a later case, United States v. Baranski,9 the jury had con-
5' Id. at 297.
See id. at 297-98; 641 F.2d at 178.
, 536 F.2d 1388, 1402 (2d Cir. 1976). In Dixon the jury convicted the defendant on a
double objective conspiracy count. Id. at 1392. On review, the Second Circuit held that the
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy to violate one of the objec-
tive offenses. id. at 1401. The court, however, upheld the conspiracy conviction. Id. at 1402.
62 Id. The Dixon court apparently reasoned that because the jury had convicted Dixon
on a substantive count validly charged in the conspiracy count, the jury's verdict must have
rested not on the impermissible ground, but on a finding that Dixon conspired to commit the
validly charged offense. See id. The Head court stated that the Dixon analysis was inap-
plicable to Head because the jury has acquitted Head on the substantive counts against him.
See 641 F.2d at 179. Therefore, the Head court declined to approve or disapprove of the
Dixon court's analysis. See id. at 179 n.7. The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that a guilty
verdict on a substantive offense does not necessarily show that the jury also found a con-
spiracy to commit that offense when the conspiracy has multiple objectives. Id.
'3 See text accompanying notes 64-75 infra.
" 471 F.2d 128 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
"Id. at 131. The grand jury indicted Tanner, Pearl, Rice, and Chipman for crimes aris-
ing out of the bombing of the S.S. Howard L. Shaw in Calumet Harbor, Chicago and a series
of other bombing episodes. Id. at 131. The jury convicted all defendants of conspiring to
bomb the Shaw. Id.
See United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d at 566; 471 F.2d at 140. The Tanner court
never specifically stated that a general verdict followed the "one is enough" instruction. See
471 F.2d at 143. The fact can be inferred, however, from the Carman court's treatment of
Tanner. See 577 F.2d at 566.
1 471 F.2d at 141. The Seventh Circuit held that the bombing of the Shaw was not a
federal crime because the ship was not within waters that would confer jurisdiction upon
the federal government. Id.
" Id. at 140.
69 484 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1973).
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victed Barangki on a triple-objective conspiracy count." The general
verdict followed the "one is enough" charge." The Seventh Circuit found
on review that one of the objective offenses was unconstitutional." The
Baranski court then reversed the conviction on the conspiracy count,
declining to speculate whether the conviction rested upon a permissible
or impermissible ground.7' The Baranski court distinguished Tanner on
the ground that the challenge in Tanner did not go to the validity of the
underlying objective offense. 4 Instead, the Tanner defendants argued
and the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's action did not in fact
constitute a substantive offense over which the United States had
jurisdiction.7
70 Id. at 558. Baranski, accompanied by three others, entered a draft board office in
Evanston, Illinois, opened the drawers and filing cabinets, pulled some files, and poured
animal blood over them. Id. The defendants then waited for police to arrive and submitted
to arrest quietly. Id. A federal grand jury later indicted Baranski on charges arising out of
the incident. Id. The indictment contained a count charging Baranski with conspiring will-
fully to damage government property in violation of section 1361 of Title 18 of the United
States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976); conspiring to remove, mutilate, and destroy govern-
ment records in violation of section 2071 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. §
2071 (1976); and conspiring to interfere with the administration of the draft in violation of
section 462(a) of Title 50 of the United States Code, 50 U.S.C. § 462(a) (1976) (omitted as
superceded). 484 F.2d at 558.
" 484 F.2d at 560.
72 Id. at 569. The Baranski court held section 462(a) of Title 50 of the United States
Code, which prohibits interference with the administration of the draft, 50 U.S.C. § 462(a)
(1976) (omitted as superceded), unconstitutional on its face for failure to give potential ac-
tors and law enforcement officials adequate guidance with respect to conduct privileged by
the first amendment. 484 F.2d at 569.
484 F.2d at 560-61, 571.
', Id. at 560; see 471 F.2d at 141. The Baranski court noted that the Tanner court held
that factually the defendants had not violated the federal statute because they bombed the
Shaw while the ship rested in waters that would not confer jurisdiction over the crime upon
the United States. 484 F.2d at 560; see note 67 supra. The Baranski court reasoned that the
Tanner holding involved the well-established principle that conspirators need not commit
the crime they are charged with conspiring to commit. Id.; see text accompanying note 5
supra. The Tanner court had reasoned, therefore, that although the defendants did not ac-
tually violate the substantive law the Government charged them with conspiring to commit,
the defendants were criminally liable for conspiring to violate the substantive offense. See
471 F.2d at 143; 484 F.2d at 560. In Baranski, however, the Government charged the defen-
dant with conspiring to violate an unconstitutional statute. 484 F.2d at 560, 569. The Baran-
ski court said that the difference distinguished Tanner. Id. at 560. The Baranski court ap-
parently reasoned that a defendant can be convicted for conspiring to violate a statute even
though the defendant did not in fact violate the statute as long as the government has the
power to punish defendants whose conduct in fact violates the statute. See id. If, on the
other hand, the government constitutionally may not punish behavior proscribed in a
statute, then the government may not punish defendants who conspire to engage in the
behavior proscribed in the statute. See id.
"' 471 F.2d at 141; see note 74 supra. One can rationalize the result, but not the broad
language in Tanner, on the theory that conspirators need not commit the crime they are
charged with conspiring to commit. See 471 F.2d at 140; text accompanying notes 5 & 68
supra.
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" The Fourth Circuit reached the appropriate conclusion in Head. In-
itially, the court properly dismissed the Government's contention that
Head failed to request an instruction on the statute of limitations issue."M
The record contains at least three requests by defense counsel for an in-
struction regarding the statute of limitations."' Having dismissed the
Government's failure to request argument, the Fourth Circuit then cor-
rectly declined to speculate whether Head's conviction rested upon a
permissible or impermissible ground and reversed his conviction."
Because the jury returned a general guilty verdict, the Fourth Circuit
could not determine whether the conviction rested upon an overt act
committed within the limitations period, nor could the court determine
whether the jury found the conspiracy related to the tax object, which
Head did not argue had required a statute of limitations instruction.7 9
The Head court, therefore, by refusing to speculate upon which overt act
the jury based its verdict, and similarly refusing to speculate which ob-
jective offense the jury found Head conspired to commit, correctly inter-
preted and followed the Supreme Court's decisions in Stromberg and
Yates holding that a reviewing court must reverse a conviction when it
cannot determine that the jury did not convict upon an impermissible
ground." Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Head creates a
clear majority view among the circuits that have considered the ques-
tion that courts must apply the Stromberg-Yates rule strictly.8'
The Head decision is consistent not only with Supreme Court prece-
dent, but also with the public's interest in the fair administration of
criminal justice.2 The Stromberg-Yates rule is both appropriate and
necessary to protect the rights of the accused.83 To permit a reviewing
court to uphold a conviction though the court cannot determine that the
conviction does not rest upon an invalid ground would be to approve a
,' See text accompanying notes 24 & 26 supra.
" 641 F.2d at 177; see note 26 supra.
78 See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
7 641 F.2d at 178; see text accompanying note 23 supra.
See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 36-40 & 42-75 supra.
See text accompanying notes 83-85 infra.
See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942). In Williams, the defen-
dants, Williams and Hendrix, both secured divorces from their North Carolina spouses in a
Nevada court. Id. at 289-90. They then returned to North Carolina where they lived
together as man and wife. Id. at 290. The state, thereafter, indicted Williams and Hendrix
for bigamous cohabitation. Id. at 289. North Carolina tried the case on alternative theories.
Id. at 290-91. First, the State contended that a Nevada divorce decree based on substitute
service where the defendant made no appearance is void in North Carolina. Id. at 290. Se-
cond, the State contended that Nevada lacked personal jurisdiction over the divorce defen-
dants because the divorce plaintiffs never acquired the prerequisite bona fide domicile in
Nevada. Id. at 291. The jury convicted Williams and Hendrix by general verdict. Id. On
review, the Supreme Court found one of the State's theories constitutionally infirm. See id.
at 297-302, 304. Unable to determine whether the jury verdict rested on the permissible
ground, the Court reversed the conviction. Id. at 304.
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procedure that could impair the defendant's rights. 4 A reviewing court
should not tolerate a procedure that may prejudice the defendant unfair-
ly. 
85
In United States v. Head, the Fourth Circuit reversed a conspiracy
conviction because the court could not determine whether the verdict
rested upon a valid or invalid ground." The Head court correctly followed
the Supreme Court's decisions in Stromberg and Yates which held that a
reviewing court must reverse a conviction when it cannot determine
that the jury did not convict upon an impermissible ground.' The Fourth
Circuit also appropriately relied upon the reasoning applied by the Third
and Ninth Circuits to this question and properly rejected the available
Second Circuit precedent.88 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit refused to
countenance a procedure that could prejudice unfairly the defendant's
rights. 9 Head, therefore, is in line with the public's interest in the fair
administration of criminal justice. 0
MICHAEL L. KRANCER
D. Misjoinder of Defendants is Reversible Error
Joinder of defendants1 and the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
', Id. at 292.
See id.
See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
IS See text accompanying notes 42-62 supra.
See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
o See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(b) Joinder of defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the same in-
dictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or
offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b).
The Advisory Committee's Notes to rule 8(b) state that the rule is substantially a
restatement of existing law. Notes to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 4 F.R.D. 405, 412
(1945); see Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 568-70 (4th Cir. 1959) (carefully consider-
ing Supreme Court and circuit court precedent for the rule); Rakes v. United States, 169
F.2d 739, 743 (4th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826 (1948). The Supreme Court has
stated that the Advisory Committee designed rule 8 to promote judicial economy and to
avoid multiple trials when a court can achieve these objectives without substantial pre-
judice to the defendant's right to a fair trial. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 n.6
(1968) (reversing defendant's conviction because of prejudicial joinder); accord, Cataneo v.
United States, 167 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1948) (suggesting that trial courts applying rule 8
should balance defendant's right to trial free from prejudice against need for judicial
economy). But see 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 141 (2d ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT] (courts should never balance right to fair trial against notions
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amendment2 cause much confusion in federal criminal proceedings.' Rule
8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the government
to join a number of defendants in a single trial if all the defendants parti-
cipated in the same act or series of acts." The double jeopardy clause pro-
of economy or efficiency). See generally Orfield, Joinder in Federal Criminal Procedure, 26
F.R.D. 23, 71-75 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Orfield] (same).
Rule 8(a) permits joinder of offenses. See notes 70 & 99 infra.
' The fifth amendment protects a defendant from double jeopardy. "[Nior shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CONST. amend V. The protection against double jeopardy extends back to ancient Greece
and Rome. See J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SIGLER]. The
English common law included pleas of former acquittal and former conviction, which barred
further prosecution. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 335 (describing bar of former
jeopardy as universal maxim of common law of England). See generally SIGLER, supra, at
3-21 (tracing development of double jeopardy doctrine in England). The prohibition against
double jeopardy has become fundamental to the American scheme of justice. See Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (double jeopardy clause of United States Constitution ap-
plies to states). See generally SIGLER, supra, at 21-34. For a discussion of the current status
of the law concerning double jeopardy, see United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117,
126-31 (1980) (dictum); Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy,
1978 SuP. CT. REV. 81 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Westen & Drubel] (analyzing past Supreme
Court decisions on double jeopardy); Tenth Annual Survey of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appea4 1979-80, 69 GEo. L.J. 403, 403-16 (1980)
(survey).
Professor Moore remarks in his treatise that no other federal rule gives rise to as
much confusion as rule 8. 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.02[1] (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE]. Professor Moore attributes the confusion to the absence of any clarification
by the Advisory Committee of the terms of rule 8. Id. at n.1. See generally ABA PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND
SEVERANCE, § 1.2 (Approved Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT]. Section 1.2
suggests new standards for the joinder of defendants. Id. The commentary to § 1.2 notes
that courts have considerable difficulty applying the broad language of rule 8(b). Id. The
commentary also discusses a number of cases in which rule 8(b) has produced conflicting
opinions. Id.
In addition to the complexities surrounding rule 8(b), the Supreme Court has com-
mented several times on the confusion surrounding the application of double jeopardy pro-
tection. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (attributing confusion to failure of
courts to distinguish between trial error and evidentiary insufficiency); Sanabria v. United
States, 437 U.S. 54, 80 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Court's struggle to create order out
of confusion surrounding its numerous double jeopardy decisions); Greene v. Massey,
437 U.S. 19, 25 n.7, 26 nn. 9 & 10 (1978) (Court expressly reserves several questions
regarding double jeopardy for future consideration). See generally Westen & Drubel, supra
note 2, at 82-85 (attributing confusion to failure of individual Supreme Court justices to
develop coherent positions regarding double jeopardy); The Supreme Cour4 1977 Term, 92
HARV. L. REV. 108, 108-09 (1978) (in 1978 alone Supreme Court overruled two lines of double
jeopardy precedent and issued decisions both expanding and contracting scope of double
jeopardy protection).
' See note 1 supra. When defendants do not engage in the same act or series of acts,
the government cannot join them properly. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 567 F.2d 849,
853 (9th Cir. 1977) (joinder was improper when government failed to show that defendants
participated in same act or series of acts); United States v. Whitehead, 539 F.2d 1023, 1026
(4th Cir. 1976) (same); United States v. Bova, 493 F.2d 33, 37 (5th Cir. 1974) (same); King v.
United States, 555 F.2d 700, 704 (1st Cir. 1966) (same); Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d
567, 569 (4th Cir. 1959) (same).
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hibits the government from retrying an acquitted defendant.' A verdict
of acquittal, however, is not valid unless it meets the requirements of
rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
6
The Fourth Circuit recently addressed claims of misjoinder and
double jeopardy in United States v. Chinchic.7 One defendant in Chinchic
claimed that a prior acquittal barred his retrial and conviction.' Both
defendants claimed that the government improperly joined them for
trial in the district court The Chinchic court first addressed the ques-
tion of whether'a jury vote of acquittal, taken in the jury room but never
announced in court, was a valid acquittal for purposes of double jeo-
pardy.' The court then considered whether the government properly
could join defendants who committed separate crimes involving common
participants.'1
In April 1977 a group of men, including Larry Roger Chinchic and
Alfred Anthony Conti, travelled from Florida to Wilmington, North
I See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129-30 (1980) (dictum) (acquittals are
accorded special weight); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (dictum) (constitu-
tional protection against double jeopardy is unequivocal); Fong Foo v. United States, 369
U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam) (double jeopardy applies even when acquittal was based on
erroneous foundation). Acquittal bars retrial, even when the acquittal is clearly erroneous,
because the government, with its superior resources, might wear down an innocent defen-
dant and obtain a wrongful conviction. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957)
(government could not retry defendant after jury discharged).
The Supreme Court has stated that the double jeopardy clause protects a defendant
against a second prosecution in three situations. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
717 (1969) (citing Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 265-66 (1965)). The double
jeopardy clause protects a defendant against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. at 143 (even when acquittal based
on judge's erroneous ruling). The double jeopardy clause protects against a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense after conviction. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-30
(1975) (state could not retry defendant as adult after convicting defendant as juvenile); In re
Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 187 (1889) (state could not try defendant for unlawful cohabitation
after convicting defendant of adultery). The double jeopardy clause protects against multi-
ple punishments for the same offense. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169-70 (1977)
(state could not impose cumulative punishments for greater and lesser offenses); Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873) (Constitution prohibits government from punishing
defendant twice for same offense as well as trying him twice).
' Rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures provides: "The verdict shall
be unanimous. It shall be returned by the jury to the judge in open court." FED. R. GRIM. P.
31(a). The federal courts have construed rule 31(a) strictly. See, e.g., United States v. Love,
597 F.2d 81, 85 (6th Cir. 1979) (verdict not valid until deliberations are over and result an-
nounced in open court); Virgin Islands v. Smith, 558 F.2d 691, 694 (3d Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 957 (1977); United States v. Taylor, 507 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1975) (same);
United States v. Medansky, 486 F.2d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 1973) (same), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
989 (1974).
7 655 F.2d 547 (1981).
Id. at 549-50.
Id. at 550.
10 Id: at 549-50; see text accompanying notes 41-45 infra.
" 655 F.2d at 550-51; see text accompanying notes 46-52 infra.
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Carolina.'2 The object of the trip was to find stores to burglarize. 3 The'
group considered, among others, Gibson's Department Store and Reed's
Jewelry Store. 4 The group burglarized Gibson's and took the stolen mer-
chandise to Conti's home in Ohio.
15
A month later the same group, less Chinchic, returned to Wilming-
ton and burglarized Reed's."6 The group took the merchandise from
Reed's to Nick Melia's home in Connecticut." Melia had arranged a
buyer for the goods.'8 Melia did not participate in the Gibson's burglary
or in the subsequent disposal of goods from Gibson's.'9
Following a FBI investigation, the government charged Chinchic,
Melia, and Conti in a single federal indictment.0 Court one charged Chin-
chic and Conti with interstate transportation of stolen goods from Gib-
son's.2 Count two charged Conti with interstate transportation of the
stolen goods from Reed's.22 Count three charged Melia with receiving the
stolen goods from Reed's.'
The government joined Chinchic, Conti, and Melia under rule 8(b)
for jury trial in the district court of the Eastern District of North
Carolina." The jury deliberated on the case for several hours, then in-
formed the judge that it had reached a unanimous decision on one defen-
dant." The jury did not indicate on which defendant it had reached its
verdict or whether the decision was for guilty or not guilty.26 The trial
judge nevertheless ordered the jury to continue deliberating. The jury
" 655 F.2d at 549. Chinchic travelled to Florida with Alfred Anthony Conti, Robert





" Id. at 549, 550.
"1 Id- at 548.
21 Id. The government charged Chinchic, Conti, Maras, Mercier, and Fraley with in-
terstate transportation of stolen goods under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976). 655 F.2d at 548, 548
n.1.
2 655 F.2d at 548. The government charged Conti, Maras, Mercier, and Fraley with in-
terstate transportation of stolen goods under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976). 655 F.2d at 548, 548
n.1.
. 655 F.2d at 548. The government charged Melia with receiving stolen goods under
18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1976). 655 F.2d at 548.
21 655 F.2d at 548 (by implication); FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). Mercier and Maras par-
ticipated in the FBI's witness protection program, therefore, the government handled their
cases separately. 655 F.2d at 548 n.1. The government did not try Fraley with Chinchic and
Melia because Fraley was missing at the time of their trial. I&
" 655 F.2d at 548.
26Id.
' Id.; see text accompanying notes 61-65 infra.
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subsequently reported that it could not reach a verdict on any count, and
the trial judge declared a mistrial.28
On retrial, both Chinchic and Melia moved for severance on the
ground of misjoinder under rule 8(b).29 The court denied the motions."0
Melia also moved for dismissal of the indictment against him on the
ground of double jeopardy.3 Melia claimed that the jury had voted to ac-
quit him at the first trial and that the double jeopardy clause, therefore,
barred a second trial on the same charge. The government stipulated
that the jury had agreed to acquit Melia, but that one juror changed his
mind after the trial judge sent the case back for further deliberation.3
The district court in the second trial denied Melia's motion for
dismissal. At the close of the government's case, Chinchic and Melia
renewed their motions for severance based on misjoinder.5 The trial
court again denied the motions. 8 The jury returned verdicts of guilty
against both defendants on all counts.
3 7
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Chinchic and Melia claimed that the
district court erroneously allowed the government to try their cases
together. 8 Chinchic and Melia contended that the two burglaries were
separate and unrelated acts and, therefore, not suitable for joinder
under rule 8(b).3 Melia further contended that the jury's vote of acquit-
655 F.2d at 548.
SId. The Fourth Circuit disposed of Conti's appeal separately. Id. at 548 n.1; United
States v. Conti, No. 80-5161 (4th Cir. July 14, 1981) (per curiam) (unpublished).
11 655 F.2d at 548. In addition to their motion for severance under rule 8, Chinchic and
Melia moved unsuccessfully under rule 14 for relief from prejudicial joinder. Id.; see note 39
infra.






-1 Id. at 550. Chinchic and Melia did not contend that the government improperly joined
Melia with the men who burglarized Reed's. Id. A defendant who receives stolen goods par-
ticipates in the same series of acts as the defendant who stole the goods. See, e.g., United
States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 29 (6th Cir.) (joinder of defendant charged with transporting
explosives and defendant charged with theft and transportation of explosives), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Kitchell v. United States, 354 F.2d 715, 718 (1st Cir.) (government prop-
erly can join one who steals cars with one who receives those stolen cars), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1011 (1966).
1 655 F.2d at 550. In addition to their claim that the trial judge erroneously allowed
their joinder under rule 8, Chinchic and Melia claimed that the trial judge erroneously
denied their motions for severance under rule 14. Id. at 554. Rule 14 permits a trial judge to
sever defendants for separate trials when joinder is proper, if it appears that the joinder
will prejudice the defendants. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14; see, e.g., United States v. Shuford, 454
F.2d 772, 776 (4th Cir. 1971) (severance proper when one defendant's defense rests on self-
incriminating testimony of codefendant); United States v. Frazier, 394 F.2d 258, 260 (4th
Cir.) (grant or denial of severance under rule 14 is in sound discretion of court), cert. denied,
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tal in the first trial should have, barred the government from retrying
him and thus his second trial constituted double jeopardy 0. The Chinchic court initially rejected Melia's double jeopardy claim."
The court found the jury did not return a valid verdict of acquittal under
rule 31." Rule 31(a) provides that the jury will return its verdict to the
judge in open court." Since the trial judge never accepted the jury's vote
of acquittal nor ever read a verdict of acquittal in open court," the Chin-
chic court held that the vote the jury took in the jury room was merely
preliminary and not a valid verdict of acquittal for double jeopardy pur-
poses."
The Chinchic court agreed, however, with Chinchic and Melia that
the government impermissibly joined them under rule 8(b).18 The court
first reviewed the record for any evidence connecting Chinchic with the
Reed's burglary or Melia with the Gibson's burglary."" The court found
nothing in the record to indicate that Chinchic took any part in the
planning or execution of the Reed's burglary, nor any suggestion that
Melia took any part in the Gibson's burglary.8 Since the court found no
evidence connecting the two burglaries, it concluded that the two
burglaries did not constitute a single act."0
The Chinchic court then considered whether the two burglaries con-
stituted a series of acts."0 The government alleged a common scheme
among all the defendants, but failed to show any proof of that theory."1
393 U.S 984 (1968). When joinder is improper under rule 8, however, the trial judge has no
discretion to deny a motion for severance. See Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 569
(4th Cir. 1959) (trial judge's denial of severance was reversible error when joinder was im-
proper). Since the Chinchic court found that misjoinder of the defendants under rule 8 was
reversible error, the court chose not to decide the appellant's claim of error based on rule
14. 655 F.2d at 551 n.4.
0 655 F.2d at 549.
IL at 549-50.
Id. at 549.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a); see note 6 supra.
" 655 F.2d at 550.
Id.; see text accompanying note 60 infra.
" 655 F.2d at 551.
' I& at 550.
45Id.
4 Id.
w Id. at 550-51. If the government in Chinchic had shown that the two burglaries con-
stituted a series of acts, the government would not have had to prove that each defendant
participated in every act. See United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978)
(joinder of defendants was proper although not every defendant charged in every count,
since acts formed single series of acts), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979); United States v.
Wofford, 562 F.2d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 916 (1978); United
States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir.) (same), cert denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973);
United States v. Godel, 361 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 838 (1966).
-See generally Moo, supra note 3, 1 8.06[2]; WIGHT, s spra note 1, § 144.
51 655 F.2d at 551; see text accompanying notes 96-103 infra.
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In the absence of any proof that the burglaries constituted a single act or
series of acts, the Chinchic court concluded that the joinder of Chinchic
and Melia did not meet the requirements of rule 8(b)."
Having concluded that the government impermissibly joined Chin-
chic and Melia, the Chinchic court considered whether the misjoinder
was reversible error.5 3 The rule in the Fourth Circuit is that misjoinder
is reversible error unless the government could have introduced at
separate trials all the evidence that it introduced at the joint trial.' The
court found nothing in the record to indicate that the government could
have introduced evidence of the Gibson's burglary at a separate trial of
Melia.5 The Chinchic court held, therefore, that since the government
could not have introduced the same evidence at separate trials, the mis-
joinder was not harmless error." Accordingly the court reversed the
1 655 F.2d at 551. The Chinchic dissent concluded that the two burglaries did con-
stitute a single series of acts. Id. at 552 (Bryan, J., dissenting). The dissent based its conclu-
sion on the similar manner of the two burglaries, their proximity in time, and the common
participants. Id. But see text accompanying notes 76-94 infra.
" 655 F.2d at 551. Rule 52(a) provides that courts should disregard any error which
does not affect the defendant's substantial rights. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (harmless error
rule). Until recently, the Fourth Circuit always held that the harmless error rule did not ap-
ply to misjoinder under rule 8. See Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 570-71 (4th Cir.
1959) (not harmless error to violate fundamental procedural rule). The Fourth Circuit
reasoned in Ingram that a jury could not distinguish between evidence the government of-
fered against different defendants. Id. at 570; accord, McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76,
81 (1896) (misjoinder not harmless error since it prejudiced defense); MOORE, supra note 3,
8.04[2]; WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 144 (relying in large part on Ingram for proposition that mis-
joinder is not harmless error). The Fourth Circuit, however, has recently adopted the posi-
tion that the harmless error doctrine applies to misjoinder of defendants. See United States
v. Seidel, 620 F.2d 1006, 1017 (4th Cir. 1980) (misjoinder harmless error since defendants not
prejudiced). See generally Fourth Circuit Review, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 526 (1981)
(critical assessment of Seidel); see also United States v. Jamar, 561 F.2d 1103, 1106 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1977) (dictum) (harmless error applies to joinder of offenses).
" 655 F.2d at 551; see United States v. Seidel, 620 F.2d 1006, 1012 (4th Cir. 1980) (mis-
joinder was harmless error since defendants were not prejudiced). A number of circuits
have adopted the position that the harmless error doctrine applies to misjoinder. See, e.g.,
United States v. Martin, 567 F.2d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 1977) (misjoinder of defendants is
harmless error when no prejudice results); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 29-30 (6th
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 972
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam) (joinder was harmless error if improper), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
965 (1970); United States v. Granello, 365 F.2d 990, 993-95 (2d Cir. 1966) (harmless error doc-
trine applies to misjoinder), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1019 (1967). But see United States v.
Marionneaux, 514 F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1975) (harmless error doctrine never applies to
misjoinder of defendants), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977); United States v. Graci, 504 F.2d
411, 413-14 (3d Cir. 1974) (same); United States v. Eagleston, 417 F.2d 11, 14 (10th Cir. 1969)
(same); Haggard v. United States, 369 F.2d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1023 (1967); King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 703 (1st Cir. 1966) (same). See generally
Note, Harmless Error and Misjoinder Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: A
Narrowing Division of Opinion, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1978).
655 F.2d at 551.
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convictions of Chinchic and Melia and remanded their cases for separate
trials.5 ,
Melia's double jeopardy claim was clearly without merit. Double
jeopardy prohibits retrial of an acquitted defendant," but does- not bar
retrial after a mistrial. 9 The Chinchic court's finding that the jury in
Melia's first trial did not return a valid verdict of acquittal has substan-
tial support. Votes taken in the jury room are merely preliminary votes
and do not bind the jury." The trial judge decides how long to keep the
jury together for deliberation." The trial judge does not have to accept
the jury's statement that the jury is deadlocked, but can order the jury
to continue deliberating.2 The trial judge likewise can order the jury to
51 I
See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (public has strong interest in
finality of criminal judgments); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 392 (1975) (pretrial
order dismissing indictment is not an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes); Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam) (acquittal based on erroneous ruling is
final); United States v. Smith, 390 F.2d 420, 423 (4th Cir. 1968) (fifth amendment forbids
retrial after acquittal). See also note 6 supra.
"' See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516-17 (1978) (double jeopardy does not bar
retrial when trial judge declares mistrial because of manifest necessity); United States v.
Sanford, 429 U.S. 14, 15-16 (1976) (double jeopardy does not bar retrial when trial court
declares mistrial because of hung jury); United States v. Ellis, 646 F.2d 132, 134-35 (4th Cir.
1981) (mistrial following deadlocked jury does not give rise to claim of former jeopardy);
United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1972) (government can bring second
prosecution when manifest necessity occasioned mistrial). See note 5 supra. The govern-
ment, however, cannot retry a defendant when the judge declares a mistrial because of pro-
secutorial misconduct. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976) (dictum); United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 n.12 (1971) (dictum).
0 See United States v. Taylor, 507 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1975) (improper for judge to
accept verdict after one juror died before verdict was announced); United States v. Medan-
sky, 486 F.2d 807, 812-13 (7th Cir. 1973) (decisions made by jury in jury room before judge
declared mistrial were not final), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); Posey v. United States,
416 F.2d 545, 554 (5th Cir. 1969) (jurors can dissent when verdict is announced), cert denied,
397 U.S. 946 (1970); Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 126 F.2d 224, 225 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) (vote taken in jury room did not bar dissent by jurors from verdict when an-
nounced).
" See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir. 1979) (trial judge did not
abuse discretion by denying jury's request for recess because of deadlock); Virgin Islands v.
Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 935 (3d Cir. 1974) (not improper for judge to instruct jurors to con-
tinue deliberating), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d
164, 169 n.2 (4th Cir. 1972) (case law does not indicate limit to judge's discretion to keep jury
deliberating); United States v. Pope, 415 F.2d 685, 690 (8th Cir. 1969) (not abuse of discretion
for judge to recall jury after only eleven hours of deliberation), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950
(1970); Mills v. Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311, 313-14 (10th Cir.) (trial judge did not abuse discretion
by sending jury back to continue deliberating after jury reported deadlock), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 847 (1963).
"2 See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896) (no error for trial judge to
require jury to continue deliberating after jury reports deadlock); United States v. Ber-
mudez, 526 F.2d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 970 (1976); United States
v. DeLaughter, 453 F.2d 908, 910-11 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972);
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continue deliberating if the jury reaches a unanimous decision on one
count but cannot decide on the other counts. 3
Rule 31(a) requires that the jury return its unanimous verdict to the
judge in open court." In refusing to find a valid verdict in the jury's
preliminary vote, the Chinchic decision is consistent with decisions of
other circuits. 5 In United States v. Taylor,"6 for example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the jury's verdict is not valid until the jury's deliberations
are over, the judge announces the verdict, and no juror dissents. 7 The
reason for the uniformly strict interpretation of the requirements for a
valid jury verdict is to allow jurors to reconsider their prior votes not
yet announced in court in light of further deliberations. 8 The reason is
especially compelling in a case like Chinchic in which the jury considers
a number of counts and defendants. 9
The Chinchic court correctly found that the government improperly
joined Chinchic and Melia. Rule 8(a) permits the government to join a
United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1341 (4th Cir. 1970) (same); Walsh v. United States,
371 F.2d 135, 136 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967); DeVault v. United
States, 338 F.2d 179, 182-83 (10th Cir. 1964) (same).
' See, e.g., United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1975) (judge refused to
accept verdict that was inconsistent with instruction); United States v. Maius, 378 F.2d 716,
717-18 (6th Cir.) (judge instructed jury who found on one count to continue deliberations),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 905 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 270 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1959)
(same), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 937 (1960). A judge can accept a jury's finding on a single count
and order the jury to continue deliberating on the remaining counts. See, e.g., United States
v'. Hockridge, 573 F.2d 752, 756 n.12, 757 (2d Cir.) (trial judge accepted finding on one count
and sent jury back to continue deliberations on other counts), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978); United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26, 31-32 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832
(1969); Morgan v. United States, 380 F.2d 686, 702 (9th Cir. 1967) (same), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 962 (1968).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a); see note 6 supra.
" See, e.g., United States v. Love, 597 F.2d 81, 85 (6th Cir. 1979) (jury has not reached
valid verdict until deliberations are over and result announced and no juror dissents in open
court); Virgin Islands v. Smith, 558 F.2d 691, 694 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 957
(1977); United States v. Taylor, 507 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); United States v.
Medansky, 486 F.2d 807, 812-13 (7th Cir. 1973) (verdict not binding on jurors until jurors
returned signed verdict in open court), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974). See generally
WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 517; see also United States v. Morris, 612 F.2d 483, 490 (10th Cir.
1979) (test for validity of verdict is whether verdict is certain, unqualified, and unambigu-
ous).
. 507 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1975). Rule 31(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that the judge can poll the jurors individually after the verdict is announced. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 31(d). Even after the verdict is announced, a juror still can change his vote until
the clerk records the verdict. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 612 F.2d 483, 489 (10th Cir.
1979) (rule 31(d) entitles juror to change his mind about verdict agreed to in jury room);
United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 724 (7th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 439 U.S. 852
(1978); United States v. Sexton, 456 F.2d 961, 966-67 (5th Cir. 1972) (same).
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number of related offenses against a single defendant." Rule 8(b) permits
the government to charge a number of defendants in a single indictment
for committing a single offense or series of offenses.' The government
has no authority, however, to join multiple defendants in a single indict-
ment for committing unrelated crimes.2
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Santoni defined "series of
acts or transactions" as "transactions so interconnected in time, place
and manner as to constitute a common scheme or plan."7 " A number of
other circuit courts have adopted this test for determining whether the
government may join defendants.74 This test for joinder is consistent
with the Supreme Court's ruling in McElroy v. United States,75 in which
the Court held that joinder of defendants is improper when the govern-
ment must depend upon different facts to convict each defendant.76 The
government clearly would have had to depend upon substantially dif-
70 Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Joinder of offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indict-
ment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged,
whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or
are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). See generally MOORE, supra note 3, 8.05; WRIGHT, supra 1, § 143;
Decker, Joinder and Severance in Federal Criminal Cases, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 147,
149-54 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Decker]; see also ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, § 1.1, Com-
mentary (describing problems with present rule and suggesting alternatives).
" FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b); see, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 603 F.2d 76, 78 (9th Cir. 1979)
(joinder proper when indictment alleged that defendants participated in same act or series
of acts), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1020 (1980); United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th
Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979); United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103,
105-06 (8th Cir. 1976) (same); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1159 (7th Cir.) (per
curiam) (same), cert denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154,
1160 (5th Cir. 1974) (same); United States v. Rickey, 457 F.2d 1027, 1029 (3d Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1972). See also note 1 supra.
I See, e.g., McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 80-81 (1896) (joinder of defendants
who participated in unrelated offenses improper); United States v. Seidel, 620 F.2d 1006,
1012 (4th Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Whitehead, 539 F.2d 1023, 1026 (4th Cir. 1976)
(same); Cupo v. United States, 359 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (same), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1013 (1967); King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 705 (1st Cir. 1966) (same); Ingram v.
United States, 272 F.2d 567, 569 (4th Cir. 1959) (same).
, United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 910
(1979); see 655 F.2d at 551.
" See, e.g., United States v. Laca, 499 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1974) (requisite connec-
tion existed between acts since acts took place at same time, place, and occasion); United
States v. Scott, 413 F.2d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1969) (same), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006 (1970);
Scheve v. United States, 184 F.2d 695, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (same); accord, United States v.
Thomas Apothecary, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 890, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (same).
" 164 U.S. 76 (1896).
" I&: at 79; see Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 404 (1894) (joinder of defendants
improper when government shows that close connection between crimes of time, place, and
occasion make it difficult to separate proof of one charge from proof of other).
1982]
614 WASHINGTONAND LEELA WREVIEW [Vol. XXXIX
ferent facts to show the time, place, and manner of Chinchic's offense
than it would have had to depend upon to show the time, place, and man-
ner of Melia's offense."
The government charged Chinchic and Melia with crimes that occur-
red over a month apart.78 The Gibson's burglary occurred in early April
and the Reed's burglary took place in mid-May. 9 Other courts have
found that the government cannot join defendants who commit crimes
separated by a significant amount of time. 0 The Fifth Circuit, for exam-
ple, in United States v. Gentile,8 found that the government could not
properly join defendants since the defendants committed the offenses
three weeks apart."
Chinchic and Melia's offenses also occurred in different places.83 The
government charged Chinchic with an offense that occurred in North
Carolina and charged Melia with an offense that occurred in Connec-
ticut. 4 Courts generally will find a single series of acts for purposes of
joinder if the government alleges that common participants committed
similar offenses at a common location.85 One court, for instance, found
See text accompanying notes 78-93 infra.
7' 655 F.2d at 548.
9 Id. at 549.
'o Compare United States v. Whitehead, 539 F.2d 1023, 1026 (4th Cir. 1976) (similar of-
fenses involving common participants occurring one month apart did not constitute single
series of acts) and King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 705 (1st Cir. 1966) (similar offenses
committed within one month of each other did not constitute single series of acts) with
Wiley v. United States, 277 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir.) (government properly could join
members of family who sold marijuana from family home on different dates several months
apart), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 817 (1960) and Kivette v. United States, 230 F.2d 749, 753 (5th
Cir. 1956) (government properly could join husband and wife who committed separate
crimes within one week of each other). See generally ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, § 1.2(c)(i),
Commentary; see also United States v. Seidel, 620 F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1980) (similar of-
fenses involving different participants two months apart did not constitute series of acts);
Ward v. United States, 289 F.2d 877, 877-78 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (similar offenses involving com-
mon participants occurring five months apart not series); Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d
567, 568-69 (4th Cir. 1959) (offenses having identity of time, location, and manner but no com-
mon participants did not constitute series of acts).
'" 495 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 630-31.
655 F.2d at 549.
Id. at 548.
See, e.g., United States v. Gentile, 495 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1974) (similar offenses
by common participants at different locations not series); Evans v. United States, 349 F.2d
653, 658 (5th Cir. 1965) (separate gambling offenses committed at single location on different
dates constituted series); Wiley v. United States, 277 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir.) (government
properly could join different members of family who sold marijuana from family home on
different dates), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 817 (1960); Daley v. United States, 231 F.2d 123,125-26
(1st Cir.) (separate gambling offenses committed at single location on different dates con-
stituted series), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 964 (1956); United States v. Garrison, 265 F. Supp.
108, 109 n.1 (M.D. Ga. 1969) (gas station at which different drug sales took place provided
sufficient nexus among defendants to support joinder). But see United States v. Jeffries, 45
F.R.D. 119, 120-21 (D.D.C. 1968) (government could not join defendants who looted same
store at approximately same time and place absent proof of concerted acts).
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joinder of defendants proper as to one count of theft in which all the of-
fenses occurred at a single building, but found joinder improper as to
another count of theft when the same defendants committed similar of-
fenses at dfifferent locations.8
Chinchic and Melia also committed two different types of offenses. 7
The government charged Chinchic with burglary and Melia with receiv-
ing stolen goods.8 Whether the government can join different offenses
depends on the degree to which the offenses are related.8 The govern-
ment establishes the proper relation by showing that the same facts
underlie both offenses." In Metheany v. United States,9 for example, the
Ninth Circuit found joinder improper when the government charged two
defendants with distinct offenses that the government could not prove
by the same evidence.2
Since Chinchic and Melia's crimes had no identity of time, place, or
manner, 3 the government obviously would have had to depend upon
substantially different facts to prove Chinchic's offense than it would
have had to depend upon to prove Melia's offense. Under the tests that
both the McElroy and Santoni courts have enunciated,94 the offenses did
" United States v. Florio, 315 F. Supp. 795, 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
655 F.2d at 548.
8Id.
See United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant who
committed two robberies could not be joined with other defendants who committed five rob-
beries), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
" See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1977) (govern-
ment can join multiple offenses if it must show same facts to prove offenses), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1159 (7th Cir.) (government can
join different offenses if it must show same evidence to prove each offense), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. Martinez, 479 F.2d 824, 828 (1st Cir. 1973) (joinder was
proper when proof of joined offenses overlapped); United States v. Wilson, 434 F.2d 494, 498
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (joinder of multiple offenses not improper when defendants participated in
single crime spree); Barnes v. United States, 381 F.2d 263, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per'curiam)
(concerted activity among defendants justified joinder); Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d
67, 71-72 (9th Cir. 1967) (joinder of different offenses not improper when all offenses related
to defendant's escape from prison); Cataneo v. United States, 167 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir.
1948) (joinder of different offenses not improper when government must prove same facts to
support alleged violations of defendants).
91 365 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 94.
's 655 F.2d at 548-49, 551; see text accompanying notes 78-79, 83-84, 87-88 supra.
See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra. The Fourth Circuit's test for joinder of
defendants under rule 8(b) incorporates the "common scheme or plan" language of rule 8(a),
which governs joinder of offenses. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a); see United States v. Santoni, 585
F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979); note 70 supra (text of rule 8(a)).
Courts clearly cannot use the less stringent requirements for joinder of offenses under rule
8(a) in determining whether the government properly joined defendants under rule 8(b). See
United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1977) (rule 8(a) applies only to
joinder against single defendant), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States v.
Whitehead, 539 F.2d 1023, 1025 (4th Cir. 1976) (court below erred in using rule 8(a) stan-
dards to join defendants); United States v. Eagleston, 417 F.2d 11, 14 (10th Cir. 1969) (court
below reversed for allowing joinder of defendants when evidence met rule 8(a) standards
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not constitute a series of acts under rule 8(b). The Chinchic court's con-
clusion that the government had no authority to join Chinchic and Melia
is consistent with the well-established rule that the government cannot
join defendants charged with separate and unrelated offenses. 5
In Chinchic the government alleged the existence of a common
scheme among the defendants."' The government failed, however, to
prove the existence of a common scheme between Chinchic and Melia. 7
The government showed only that the two burglaries had some common
participants. 8 The Fourth Circuit made clear in United States v. White-
head99 that the mere existence of some common participants among
defendants is not sufficient to support joinder of defendants whom the
government charges with unrelated crimes."' In Whitehead the govern-
ment charged two defendants who lived in the same apartment complex
but not rule 8(b) standards). See generally MOORE, supra note 3, 8.0611]; WRIGHT, supra
note 1, § 144; Orfield, supra note 1, at 71. Since rule 8(b) does not define "series of acts,"
however, some authorities suggest that courts should read "series of acts" in rule 8(b) in
light of rule 8(a)'s "common scheme" language. See Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930,
933 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 395 U.S. 830 (1969); MOORE, supra note 3, 8.06[1];
WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 144. Contra United States v. Whitehead, 539 F.2d at 1024 ("common
plan" language does not apply to joinder of defendants).
"s See note 72 supra.
" 655 F.2d at 551.
'1 Id. The Chinchic court noted that although the government alleged the existence of
a common plan, the government failed to allege the existence of a conspiracy among the
defendants. Id. at 551 n.3. The court implied that the reason for the government's joinder of
Chinchic and Melia was for the convenience of the government's witnesses. Id Proof of a
conspiracy among defendants supports joinder even when the government offers no direct
proof that the defendants participated in a single act or series of acts. See, e.g., Schaffer v.
United States, 362 U.S. 511, 514-16 (1960) (government properly joined defendants charged
with separate offenses when government also charged defendants with conspiracy); United
States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 789 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976);
United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 729-30 (3d Cir.) (conspiracy satisfies requirements of
rule 8(b)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832 (1974); United States v. Godel, 361 F.2d 21, 23-24 (4th
Cir.) (conspiracy count provides sufficient connection between defendants charged with
separate offenses), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 838 (1966). But cf. United States v. Donaway, 447
F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1971) (government cannot add conspiracy count merely to obtain
joinder); United States v. Manfredi, 275 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir.) (government must make con-
spiracy charge in good faith), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 828 (1960). See generally Decker, supra
note 70, at 157-60: MOORE, supra note 3, 8.06[4]; WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 144. Even if the
trial court dismisses a weak conspiracy count before submitting the case to the jury, the
government has met and satisfied the requirements of rule 8(b) since it alleged in the indict-
ment that the defendants participated in the same series of acts by participating in a con-
spiracy. See Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1960) (dismissal of conspiracy
count does not require severance of defendants even though government based joinder on
existence of conspiracy); Stern v. United States, 409 F.2d 819, 820 (2d Cir. 1969) (same);
United States v. O'Brien, 319 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1963) (same).
"' 655 F.2d at 551.
" 539 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 1026.
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with similar offenses on different dates involving a common third partici-
pant. ' The government asked the court to infer a common scheme be-
tween the defendants from the similarity of the crimes.' 2 The Fourth
Circuit refused to make the inference in the absence of any proof of a
common plan.' 3 The Whitehead court further found that the existence of
a common participant was not sufficient to support joinder under rule
8(b).
1 04
One problem with rule 8(b) is that the rule allows the government to
join defendants if the indictment or information merely charges that the
defendants participated in the same series of acts.' 5 A court often can-
not determine whether the proper relation exists among defendants un-
til the government has presented its evidence.'0 A pre-trial conference
under rule 17.1"11 or an in camera inspection of the government's
evidence under rule 14108 would allow a court to save the time and ex-
pense of a joint trial and spare defendants from prejudicial joinder by
determining at an earlier time whether the government's evidence war-
rants joinder. 0 9
In Chinchic the government attempted to join two defendants who
committed separate and unrelated crimes.10 The court correctly found
that since these two crimes were distinct in time, place, and manner, the
government had no authority to join the defendants under rule 8(b)."'
The court also correctly held that the government did not subject one
defendant to double jeopardy, since the defendant's first trial never pro-
duced a valid verdict of acquittal."' The Fourth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Chinchic is consistent with decisions of other circuits
1 13
and should help affirm established principles of joinder and double
jeopardy.
WILLIAM R. CLEMENT, JR.
,0 Id. at 1024.
'o Id. at 1025.
103 Id.
"I Id. at 1206; accord, Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 571 (4th Cir. 1959) (ex-
istence of common participant among counts does not justify joinder).
,' FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b); see note 1 supra.
106 See Note, Joint and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of.
Criminal Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 564-65 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Joint and Single
Trials] (noting that delay will prejudice defendant).
"' FED. R. CRim. P. 17.1.
," FED. R. RIM. P. 14.
' See Joint and Single Trials, supra note 106, at 564-65.
1 See text accompanying notes 12-23 supra.
I See text accompanying notes 46-52 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra.
" See notes 65-72 supra.
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E. Substitution of Alternate Jurors Under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 24(c)
The right of the criminally accused to trial before an impartial jury
is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence, guaranteed by both
article IIIP and the sixth amendment2 of the Constitution. Principal
among the procedural devices that assure the right to jury trial is
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1 Subsection (c) of rule 24 pre-
vents delay or mistrial during protracted trials when a regular juror
becomes ill or otherwise is incapacitated.4 Rule 24(c) permits federal
courts to impanel up to six alternate jurors in a criminal proceeding and
to substitute the alternates for regular jurors any timie prior to submis-
sion of the case to the jury.' The decision to substitute an alternate for a
regular juror upon a showing of good cause is within the discretion of
the trial judge and does not require the consent of either party to the
proceeding.6 In United States v. Evans,7 the Fourth Circuit considered
whether a defendant's consent to the district court's departure from rule
' U.S. CONST. art. III. Section 2 of article III states that the trial of all crimes except
impeachment shall be by jury. Id at § 2.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states that the defendants in all
criminal prosecutions are entitled by right to speedy and public trials before impartial
juries. Id. See People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 692, 552 P.2d 742, 745, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782,
785, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1976) (substitution of alternate juror for good cause is
desirable to maintain judicial efficiency, but may encroach upon defendant's right to trial by
jury).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c).
See, e.g., United States v. Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442, 444 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (regular
juror suffered heart attack during deliberations following over four months of trial, court
substituted alternate onto jury to avoid mistrial); United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565,
566 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (court substituted alternate onto jury when regular juror was excused
for medical reasons during deliberations following seven month conspiracy trial); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 24(c).
1 FED. R. GRIM. P. 24(c). Rule 24(c) states that prior to the submission of the case to the
jury the district court may substitute alternate jurors for any regular jurors whom the
court has found to be disqualified or unable to perform their duties. Id.
Many states have adopted statutes or rules of court similar to rule 24. The state provi-
sions fall into two broad categories. One group of state statutes provides for alternate or
substitute jurors. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1089 (West 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
601a (West 1979). For example, the California statute providing for alternate jurors permits
the trial court to substitute alternates onto the jury either before or after the jury retires
to begin its deliberations. CAL. PENAL CODE at § 1089. The second category of state statutes
provides for the selection of additional jurors, authorizing the trial court to impanel 13 or 14
jurors prior to trial. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 234, § 26B (West 1979); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.18 (West 1968). Under the second category, the court selects by lot
the twelve jurors who will deliberate immediately before submitting the case to the jury.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. at § 26B. The additional jurors remaining then are excused by the
court. Id
' See United States v. Ellenbogen, 365 F.2d 982, 989 (2d Cir. 1966), cert denied, 386
U.S. 923 (1967).
635 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 101 S. Ct. 3090 (1981).
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24(c) operates as an effective waiver of objections ,to the substitution
procedure.'
Appellant Evans was found guilty of bank robbery before the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland.' Upon the conclusion
of both parties' presentations at trial, the judge excused alternate juror
Nancy Stiles, and the jury retired to consider its verdict." After the jury
deliberated for approximately fifty minutes, the judge received a note
from one of the regular jurors." The note stated that the juror had
overheard conversations between spectators during the lunch break
that possibly could influence his deliberations.'2 Accordingly, the court
examined the juror and subsequently excused the juror from further
service. 13 The judge explained to the defendant that he had the option of
a mistrial.4 The judge stated that Evans, as authorized by Federal Rule
of Procedure 23(b), could choose alternatively to continue the.trial with
eleven jurors. 5 While the judge was in the process of offering the defen-
dant a choice between seeking a mistrial or continuing, the judge noticed
that the alternate juror, Ms. Stiles, had returned to the courtroom. 6 The
judge called Ms. Stiles before the bench and questioned her to determine
whether she had discussed the case or had otherwise been "tainted" in
any way outside the courtroom." Once the judge was satisfied that out-
side influences had not compromised Ms. Stiles' impartiality, the court
presented Evans with the option of accepting her as a twelfth member of
the jury or moving for a mistrial.'8 The possibility of continuing the trial
with an eleven member jury received no further consideration. 9 Con-
trary to the advice of his appointed counsel, Evans agreed to the seating
Id at 1127.
Id at 1125.
" Id at 1126-27, 1129.
" Id. at 1129.
12 Id. at 1126. The juror had overheard conversations between spectators who ap-
parently knew the defendant. Brief for Appellant at 3, United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d
1124 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. The spectators remarked on
Evans' appearance at trial, and referred to the money stolen in the robbery. Id
" 635 F.2d at 1126.
" Id.
11 Id- Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b) states that at any time before the ver-
dict, and with the approval of the court, the parties may stipulate that a jury of less than 12
may return a valid verdict should the court excuse one or more of the regular jurors. FED.
R. CRiM. P. 23(b).
635 F.2d at 1129.
' Id. at 1127.
" Brief for appellant at 5.
" 635 F.2d at 1127. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b), note 15, supra. The district court record
does not indicate whether the defendant expressed himself either in favor of or opposed to
the use of an elevan man jury. 635 F.2d at 1126 n.2. For the purpose of appeal, counsel
stipulated that Evans had expressed himself as wishing to avoid mistrial. Id. See text ac-
companying notes 44-46 (Evans dissent arguing defendant's consent ineffective absent com-
plete explanation of rule 23(b)).
1982]
WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WREVIEW
of Ms. Stiles as the twelfth juror.0 Consequently, the judge summoned
the jury into the courtroom and placed Ms. Stiles on the jury." The jury
retired to continue its deliberations and returned a verdict of guilty on
all counts within forty minutes.2 Evans appealed the decision to the
Fourth Circuit."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered the crucial issue to be
whether the substitution procedure employed by the district court had
been so fundamentally unfair to Evans as to make his consent ineffec-
tive. 4 To decide that issue, the Fourth Circuit considered whether
Evans' consent was given intelligently and knowingly. 5 In addition, the
court considered whether the district court's failure to instruct the jury
to begin its deliberations anew had prejudiced Evans' case.
Initially, the Fourth Circuit examined the language of rule 24(c)Y
The court noted that rule 24(c) expressly does not prohibit the substitu-
tion of an alternate for a regular juror after the jury retires. 8 Never-
theless, the Evans court did not decide whether the district court's ac-
tion violated rule 24(c). Instead, the court considered whether Evans'
consent to the substitution was knowing and intelligent.' Finding Evans
knowingly and intelligently consented, 0 the Fourth Circuit relied on a
Id. at 1127 n.3.
21 I at 1127.
= Brief for Appellant at 5.
635 F.2d at 1125.
2& d at 1127. In addition to raising the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c) issue,
Evans alleged that the district court erred in refusing to allow Evans' former girlfriend to
testify about certain conversations she had held with him. Id at 1125. Evans argued that
the conversations would establish his innocence on the robbery charge because, in the con-
versations, Evans allegedly explained that his sudden wealth after the bank robbery was
the consequence of his concealing a fugitive from the robbery at his home for which the
fugitive gave him $10,000. Id The Fourth Circuit refused to consider the defendant's assign-
ment of error, holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) was dispositive of the ques-
tion. Id Rule 804(b)(3) states that declarations against interest are exceptions to the hearsay
rule and are admissable when corraborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthi-
ness of the statement. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). Evans argued that the conversations should
qualify as declarations against interest. 635 F.2d at 1125. Based on the fact that Evans'
spending spree, which began the day after the bank robbery, involved expenditures of
almost $12,000 in cash, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that circumstances did not support the
reliability of Evans' statements and thus affirmed the district court's refusal to admit the
conversations as evidence. Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1128.
SId. at 1127. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c), text accompanying notes 3-6 supra.
28 1
IdH at 1127-1128.
o Id. at 1128. The Evans court held that the defendant's consent satisfied the re-
quirements of Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). Id at 1127-28. In Patton, the
Supreme Court held that, given the importance of trial by jury, any waiver of jury trial
rights requires the express and intelligent consent of the defendant, the consent of the
government's counsel, and the sanction of the court. 281 U.S. at 312. The Patton Court
stated that trial courts should employ sound and advised discretion in exercising their duty
to assure express and intelligent waiver before allowing defendants to dispense with jury
trial rights. Id-
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Tenth Circuit decision to conclude that Evans, by consenting to the sub-
stitution of a previously discharged alternate juror, waived all objec-
tions to the procedure."
The Fourth Circuit's holding that Evans' consent was effective
against later objections was premised on the court's further holding that
the procedure employed by the district court had not been so inherently
unfair to the defendant to require reversal of the defendant's conviction.
32
The Fourth Circuit was satisfied that the reconstituted jury could
dispose of the case effectively and without prejudice.' The court deter-
mined that the district court's examination of the alternate juror was
sufficient to preclude the possibility that Ms. Stiles' impartiality was
destroyed while she was outside the courtroom. 34 Moreover, the Evans
court reasoned that the trial court should not force the defendant to
seek a mistrial with the consequence of being placed in jeopardy a sec-
ond time.'5 Because the defendant's knowing and intelligent choice to
continue trial with the reconstituted jury eliminated the necessity for
mistrial, the Fourth Circuit concluded the procedure employed by the
district court was not fundamentally unfair 6
In addition, the Fourth Circuit dismissed as speculative Evans' argu-
ment that the district court's failure to instruct the jury to begin its
deliberations anew had prejudiced his case. The court reasoned that
the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury was insufficient to warrant
reversal, especially given the fact that the defense had not objected to
the lack of an instruction at trial. Thus, because the defendant's con-
sent to the procedure employed by the district court was valid, because
the substitution of the alternate juror was not inherently prejudicial,
and because the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to begin its
deliberations anew had not compromised the defendant's case, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed Evans' conviction. 9
3, 635 F.2d at 1127 (citing United States v. Baccari, 489 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam), cert denied, 417 U.S. 914 (1974)). In Baccari, the court excused the alternate juror at
the close of arguments and submitted the case to the jury. 489 F.2d at 275. During the jury's
deliberations one of the regular jurors became ill and was hospitalized. Id. Counsel for both
parties and the court agreed that the court should recall the alternate. Id. In addition, the
defendants individually stated their approval of the plan. Id. The Tenth Circuit thus found
that the defendants had consented knowingly and intelligently to the substitution, and
therefore waived any objections that could have been interposed. Id.
31 635 F.2d at 1128. The Evans court acknowledged that the question whether the trial
court's substitution of the alternate had a prejudicial effect on the defendant would have
presented no difficulty if the district court had made the substitution before the jury
retired. Id at 1127.
1 Id. at 1127.
34 Id.
I Id. at 1127-28.
3 Id at 1128. See note 53 infra (Evans court distinguished prior Fourth Circuit prece-
dent).
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In the dissent, Judge Ervin argued that the procedure employed by
the district court allowing the substitution of an alternate juror after the
judge had submitted the case to the jury was clear and reversible
error." The dissent interpreted rule 24(c) to mandate that the jury which
retires to consider a case must be the jury the returns the verdict.4 '
Judge Ervin supported his interpretation of rule 24(c) with two prior
Fourth Circuit decisions which read the rule to require the dismissal of
alternate jurors when the jury retires.42 The dissent noted that the deci-
sions were premised on the theory that the trial court, by failing to
discharge the alternates when the jury retires, subjects the defendant to
trial before thirteen jurors in violation of rule 23(b)
Moreover, Judge Ervin argued that the Fourth Circuit could not con-
sider Evans' consent to the substitution to be a binding waiver of objec-
tions to the substitution procedure.4 The dissent reasoned that waiver
never can be effective where the district court has not presented the
defendant all the procedural options.4 Judge Ervin took the position
that Evans could not have given knowing and intelligent consent to the
substitution absent a complete explanation of his right to an eleven juror
trial under rule 23(b).
4 6
The Fourth Circuit's holding that Evans' consent to the substitution
effectively precluded any objection to the procedure on appeal is sup-
ported by other federal circuits that have held consent effective against
later objections to departures from the express language of rule 24(c).
4
1
11 Id. at 1129 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
41 I&
42 Id., citing United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978) and United States
v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964). See note 53 infra (facts and holdings
in Chatman and Virginia Erection). The dissent relied on the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Virginia Erection that rule 24(c) explicitly makes no provision for the replacement of
regular jurors after the jury retires. 635 F.2d at 1129, see 335 F.2d at 871. The dissent fur-
ther cited 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 388 at 52 (1969) for the proposi-
tion that clear and reversible error results if the district court substitutes an alternate after
deliberations have begun. 635 F.2d at 1131.
11 635 F.2d at 1129. See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 871 (4th Cir. 1964).
11 635 F.2d at 1131.
"Id.
48 Id. The dissent relied on Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) for the proposi-
tion that effective waiver requires the intelligent consent of defendant. Id.; see 281 U.S. at
312 (defendant's waiver of jury trial rights requires express and intelligent consent of defen-
dant, consent of government's counsel and sanction of court). Judge Ervin argued that,
because the district court gave Evans the choice only of seeking mistrial or consenting
to the substitution of the alternate, Evans could not have given informed consent to the
substitution. 635 F.2d at 1131. See text accompanying notes 13-18, supra (trial court's ex-
planation to defendant).
" See Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175, 179 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 986 (1980)
(acquiescence of defense counsel preclude later objection to substitution of previously
discharged alternate onto jury after deliberations had begun); United Staes v. Viserto, 596
F.2d 531, 539-540 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979) (stipulated consent by defense
[Vol. XXXIX
FOURTH CIRCIT RE VIE W
Nevertheless, a number of circuit court decisions have recognized the
possibility that trial courts, by failing todischarge the alternate jurors
when the jury retires, may prejudice the defendant's case. 8 Employing
reasoning similar to the Evans dissent, the Second and Fifth Circuits
have noted that thepossibility of prejudice arises because a defendant
runs the risk of being tried by more than twelve jurors when the district
court fails to discharge the alternates upon submission of the case to the
jury.49 In addition the Tenth Circuit has held that a trial court committed
counsel to district court impanelling 16 jurors without designating which jurors would serve
as alternates held to preclude later objections); United States v. Baccari, 489 F.2d 274, 275
(10th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 914 (1974) (defendant's consent to recall
and substitution of previously discharged alternate held to constitute binding waiver of ob-
jections to procedure); Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
385 U.S. 802 (1966) (stipulated approval by counsel operates as binding and effective waiver
of objections to district court's failure to dismiss alternates when jury retired). In Hender-
son, a regular juror suffered a heart attack during the jury's deliberations. 613 F.2d at 176.
The trial court recalled a previously discharged alternate, who was then examined by both
the court and counsel to determined whether the alternate could render a fair decision. Id.
With defense counsel's reluctant acquiescence, the district court reinstated the alternate.
Id at 177. The defendant was not present at the examination or reinstatement. Id. The
Seventh Circuit held the procedure permissible. Id. at 178-79. Reasoning that the district
court's thorough examination of the alternate in the presence of defense counsel affirmed
the alternate's ability to make a fair decision, the Seventh Circuit held that the consent of
defense counsel to the substitution precluded any possibility of prejudice and barred any
subsequent objections to the procedure. Id. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the defendant's
argument that a binding Patton waiver requires the personal consent of the defendant
because the substitution had not deprived the defendant of a constitutional jury, and thus
the procedures prescribed by Patton were inapplicable. Id. at 179. See Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); note 30, supra (Evans majority held defendant's consent
satisfied Patton requirements). In Viserto, the district court impaneled 16 jurors prior to
trial. 596 F.2d at 539. The trial court then allowed counsel to select, immediately before sub-
mission of the case to the jury, the 12 jurors who would retire. Id. While holding that the
stipulated approval of defense counsel to the procedure precluded subsequent objections,
Id., at 540, the Second Circuit stated that rule 24 represents a national consensus of bench
and bar from which a court should not depart. Id. The Viserto court noted that the district
court's substitution of an alternate after deliberations have begun would present a different
case entirely. Id.
48 See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978) (district court by
inadvertantly allowing alternate to accompany regular jurors when jury retired, held to
have committed reversible error); United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1973),
affirmed, 487 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974) (district
court committed error in allowing alternate juror under strict instruction to remain silent to
accompany jury during deliberations); United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d. 468, 469 (10th Cir.
1972) (district court, by allowing alternate juror to retire with jury, committed reversible
error); United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968),
subsequent appeal sub. nom., United States v. Nash, 414 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 940 (1969) (recognizing possibility of prejudice presented by district court's failure to
discharge alternate jurors when jury retires); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335
F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964) (district court held to have committed reversible error by allowing
alternate juror to retire with jury). See note 53 infra (Va. Erection and Chatman decisions).
"9 See United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir.), affirmed, 487 F.2d 339 (5th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974). In Hayutin, the district court failed to
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reversible error by inadvertantly allowing an alternate to accompany
the regular jurors as they retired, because the procedure violated the
privacy essential to the jury's function."0
The Fourth Circuit in two prior decisions held that district courts
committed reversible error by allowing alternate jurors to accompany
regular jurors when the juries retired.5 In both cases the Fourth Circuit
premised its decision on the theory that the alternate could influence the
regular jurors by his very presence, thereby compromising the defen-
dant's right to trial before twelve jurors." The Evans majority con-
sidered cases dealing with prejudice arising from the possibility of trial
before thirteen jurors to be distinguishable and insufficient to render
Evans' consent ineffective.5 3 Nevertheless, a trial court's substitution of
an alternate juror onto the jury after deliberations have begun may sub-
discharge the alternates upon submitting the case to the jury. 398 F.2d at 950. The court did
not allow the alternates to retire with the regular jurors, but kept the alternates isolated
from the regular jurors at all times. Id. The Second Circuit, while noting that trial courts
should treat rule 24(c) as mandatory and that the possibility of prejudice arises when
district courts ignore rule 24, held that the district court's error was harmless. Id. The
Hayutin court premised its decision on the district court's careful separation of the alter-
nates from the regular jurors, thus precluding the possibility that the trial court subjected
the defendant to a trial by more than twelve jurors. Id. In Allison, the district court allowed
an alternate juror who was under strict instructions to remain silent to accompany the jury
as it retired. 481 F.2d at 469. The Fifth Circuit held that the procedure employed by the
district court warranted remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the alter-
nate's presence had compromised the defendant's right to trial before twelve jurors. Id at
470. See text accompanying note 43 supra (Evans dissent argued that district court's
substitution procedure subjected defendant to trial before thirteen jurors).
50 See United States Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 470 (10th Cir. 1972). In Beasley, the Tenth
Circuit stated that the district court, by allowing an alternate to retire with the jury,
violated the defendant's right to a trial by 12 jurors because the alternate, once delibera-
tions began, became a stranger to the proceedings in a legal sense. Id at 469. Thus, the
court reasoned, the district court had compromised the defendant's rights just as surely as
if the judge had allowed a stranger off the street to participate in the jury's deliberations.
Id.
51 See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 871 (4th Cir. 1964); note 53 infra (Chatman and
Virginia Erection facts and holdings).
' See 584 F.2d at 1361, 335 F.2d at 871; note 53 infra (Chatman and Virginia Erection-
facts and holdings).
-" 635 F.2d at 1128 n.5. The Evans courts considered two prior Fourth Circuit opinions
that held variations on rule 24(c) to be reversible error. Id. at 1128 n.5. See United States v.
Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d
868 (4th Cir. 1964). The court distinguished Chatman and Virginia Erection from Evans
because the procedures employed by the district courts in Chatman and Virginia Erection
contained an inherent possibility of prejudice. 635 F.2d at 1128 n.5. See 584 F.2d at 1361, 335
F.2d at 871. In Chatman, the district court inadvertantly failed to excuse the alternate juror
upon submitting the case to the jury. 584 F.2d at 1361. The alternate accompanied the
regular jurors as they retired, and remained in the jury room for the first 45 minutes 'of the
jury's deliberations. Id Upon discovering his oversight, the trial judge excused the alter-
nate juror. Id The trial court subsequently made no inquiry to determine the extent of the
alternate's participation. Id On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered the district court's ac-
tions to constitute reversible error because the defendant was tridd by thirteen jurors. Id.
The Chatman court relied on the Fourth Circuit's prior decision in Virginia Erection, the
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ject the defendant to trial before thirteen jurors." The Fourth Circuit,
by allowing the district court's substitution in Evans to stand, chose to
disregard Fourth Circuit precedents that recognize the possibility of
prejudice presented by substitution procedures that depart from rule 24.
In addition to the possibility of prejudice arising from trial before
more than twelve jurors, courts have recognized a danger of prejudice
from the inherent coercive effect upon an alternate juror who joins a
jury which has already agreed that the defendant is guilty.5 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that regular jurors could exert a coercive influence
upon the alternate in United States v. Lamb. 6 In Lamb, the district
court substituted an alternate onto a jury that had been deliberating for
more than four hours and which previously had returned a guilty verdict
that the district court rejected as inconsistent with the instructions. 7
The Ninth Circuit held the substitution to be reversible error, not only
trial court permitted the variation on rule 24(c) because one of the regular jurors appeared
ill. 335 F.2d at 870. Although the district court judge admonished the alternate to remain
silent, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless found the district court's procedure to be reversible
error. Id at 871. The court was concerned that the procedure presented practical difficulties
because the trial court could not have determined when the regular juror became too ill to
continue. Id. The court was further concerned that the alternate, by his very gestures or at-
titude, could influence the jury's deliberations. Id. The Fourth Circuit was convinced that
the alternate's presence in the jury room violated the privacy-and secrecy essential for a
jury to function properly. Id. at 872. In contrast, the Evans court held that the procedure
employed by the district court in the instant case contained no inherent possibility of pre-
judice because the defendant expressly had consented to the substitution and because the
trial court had not allowed more than 12 jurors to deliberate at any time. 635 F.2d at 1128
n.5.
s See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 871 (4th Cir. 1964). See text accompanying notes 42-43
supra (Evans dissent relied on Chatman and Virginia Erection).
I See, e.g., United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (brief
period of deliberations following substitution held to be evidence of coercion exerted on
alternate by regular jurors); People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 693, 552 P.2d 742,746, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 782, 786, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1976) (right to trial by jury requires that each
juror participate in all of jury's deliberations); People v. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d 100, 103, 224
N.E.2d 710, 712, 278 N.Y.S.2d 199, 202 (1966) (where trial court substitutes alternate onto
jury at stage of jury's deliberations where remaining eleven jurors are in substantial agree-
ment, alternate juror must overcome formidable obstacles in attempts to persuade and con-
vince 11 original jurors); see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY
JURY 82 (1968) (undesirable to allow juror who is unfamiliar with prior deliberations to join
jury and participate in voting without benefit of prior deliberations); Wasserman and Robin-
son, Extra-begal Influences, Group Processes and Jury Decision Making: A Psychological
Perspective, 12 N.C. CENTRAL L. REV. 96, 115 (1980) (following group discussion, entire jury
will endorse values initially favored by majority of original jury members more strongly
-than values advanced by minority). See text accompanying notes 55-57, infra (discussion of
United States v. Lamb).
529 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1975).
5 Id. at 1155. In Lamb, the substitution of an alternate for a regular juror became
necessary after the regular juror asked the trial judge to excuse her. Id. The juror felt the
sudden accidental death of a co-worker left her emotionally unable to perform her duties as
a juror. Id. After examining the juror, the judge excused her and substituted a previously
discharged alternate onto the jury. Id.
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because the defendant had not consented to the procedure, but also
because the circuit court believed the brief amount of time the jury took
to reach a second guilty verdict after the substitution manifested imper-
missible coercion on the alternate. 8
Concerned with the possibility that the remaining original jurors
will coerce an alternate, a number of courts have held that a trial court
substituting an alternate onto the jury after the jury has retired must
instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew. 9 In United States v.
Barone, ° the district court examined each of the remaining eleven jurors
to determine their willingness and ability to begin deliberations anew."
The judge reasoned that individual exmination of the jurors as well as an
instruction ordering their deliberations to begin anew was necessary to
negate any coercive effect substitution might have had on the alternate.62
The district court considered the defendant's right to jury trial to
necessarily include the right to have each juror fully engage in all of the
jury's deliberations. 3 Thus, to avoid any possibility of prejudice, the
district court in Evans, in addition to securing the defendant's knowing
and intelligent consent to the substitution, should have instructed the
jury to begin its deliberations anew.
The Fourth Circuit in Evans correctly followed judicial precedent
that holds that a defendant's proper consent to the substitution of an
Id at 1156.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 608 F.2d 598, 599 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1979) (defendant's stipulated consent and district court's instruction
that jury must begin deliberations anew preclude possibility of prejudice); United States v.
Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442, 444 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (upon substitution after jury has retired jury
instructions ordering deliberations begin anew are necessary to follow procedure established
in United States v. Barone); United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 365, 571 (S.D. Fla. 1979)
(district court preserved inviolate defendants right to unanimous verdict by jury of twelve
where court instructed jury to begin deliberations anew and substituted alternate fully par-
ticpated in deliberations); Griesel v. Dart Industries, 23 Cal. 3d 583, 584, 591 P.2d 503, 506,
153 -Cal. Rptr. 213, 216 (1979) (en banc) (alternate juror statute construed as requiring trial
court to instruct jury to begin deliberations anew to protect defendant's right to have each
juror engage in all jury's deliberations); People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 694, 552 P.2d 742,
747, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 787, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1976) (alternate juror statute con-
strued as requiring trial court to instruct jury to begin deliberations anew because law
grants both state and defendant right to verdict reached after full participation of 12 jurors
who ultimately return verdict). Cf. United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.
1975) (en ban) .(brief period of reconstituted jury's deliberations persuaded court that jury
could not have followed trial court's instruction to begin their deliberations anew).
83 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
" Id. at 567. In Barone, one of the regular jurors developed health problems some two
days after deliberations began. Id. at 566. Upon learning of the regular juror's problem, the
trial court requested one of the previously discharged alternates to return to court. Id. The
court sequestered the alternate pending resolution of the regular juror's problem. Id. at
567. The trial judge excused the regular juror, because he was convinced she would be
unable to perform her duties. Id. The court then examined the alternate regarding her ex-
posure to media reports of the case and any discussions she might have had about the case.





alternate after the jury has retired bars any later objections he might
have to the procedure, absent actual prejudice. 4 The Evans court,
similar to opinions holding that consent is effective against later objec-
tions, implicitly was attempting to address the practical difficulties
presented by strict adherence to rule 24(c) substitution procedures.6 5 The
Evans court failed to recognize, however, the substantial possibility of
prejudice presented by the district court's failure to instruct the jury to
begin its deliberations anew following the substitution. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2 imposes an obligation on the courts to construe the
federal rules to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administra-
tion and elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.66 In carrying out
their obligation, the courts must realize that criminal defendants con-
ceivably will consent to questionable procedural options rather than
seek mistrial, since mistrial often involves jail time spent awaiting a new
trial. The Evans court, by approving the district court's sulbstitution pro-
cedure, clearly has promoted simplicity in procedure and elimination of
expenditures of both judicial and prosecutorial resources. Concerns of
economy and simplification of procedure have led the American bar to
consider changes in rule 24.67 Unless and until rule 24 is altered by con-
sensus of bench and bar, rule 24 remains the single viable tool available
to criminal trial courts in the federal system for accomplishing the
substitution of alternate jurors. Regrettably, the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Evans, by holding the defendant's consent to be an effective
waiver of all subsequent objections, raises the standard of prejudice a
defendant must demonstrate to protect his right to trial before an impar-
tial jury of twelve jurors.
TOM GRUENERT
See text accompanying note 47 supra (cases holding that defendant's consent bars
subsequent objections).
See text accompanying note 47 supra (courts holding defendant's consent bars later
objections faced factual situations in which adherence to rule 24 would lead to delay and
mistrial). Paisley, The Federal Rule on Alternate Jurors, 51 A.B.A.J. 1044, 1045 (1965)
(strict reading of rule 24(c) results in discharge of alternate at crucial time, increases risk of
delay and possibility of mistrial).
FED. R. CRIlM. P. 2.
See Orfield, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 45-46 (1962). The
committee history of the federal rules reveals that the United States Supreme Court Ad-
visory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure considered adopting a rule that would
permit trial courts to substitute alternates onto the jury during deliberations. Id. The Com-
mittee rejected the proposed rule when the Supreme Court questioned the rule's constitu-
tionality and desirability. Id. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41 (1981). The proposed amendments
would allow trial courts to retain the alternate jurors after the regular jurors have retired.
Id. The trial courts then could substitute the alternates onto the jury at any time before the
jury returns its verdict. Id. Under the proposed amendments a trial court substituting an
alternate onto the jury after the jury has retired must instruct the jury to begin its
deliberations anew. Id.
1982]
